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including some which increase the concentration of land. Here the
discussion is limited to cases in which an increase in the number
of families with access to enough land to helo them avoid poverty
is at least a reasonably likely result, since otherwise it would




1, Land Distribution, and Small-Farm Policy as
Preventive of Humanitarian Emergencies
1. Introduction
Most humanitarian emergencies with mainly economic causes
occur in quite poor countries. Most such emergencies involve land
in some way. Famines are due to problems in the realm of production
and distribution of food. Rural violence often revolves around land
disputes and/or landlessness. And a bad distribution of land
contributes to low incomes, poverty and maldistribution of income,
all of which tend to go with poor infrastructure, poor health and
educational services and other factors which make emergencies more
likely than otherwise to occur. Accordingly it is argualbe that the
strongest preventive of a wide range of types of humanitarian
emergencies is a good land distribution, or more precisley as ystem
of land rights which provides braod access to the popualtion,
combined with policies strongly supportive of small-scale
agriculture. When the initial land distribution differs markedly
from the desired one, this will imply a need for agrarian reform.
Ironically, though its potential for good is seldom tapped, those
relatively few episodes where it has been have contributed
positively to the welfare of tens of millions of people (perhaps
hundreds of millions) of the most down-trodden people and made this
type of reform one of the most welfare-increasing things that can
happen in a country and one of the best forsm of insurance agains
humanitarian emergiencies.
Land distribuiton is of course only one of the many factors
which afect the liklihood and severity of Complex Humanitarian
Emrgencies (CHEs), as well as other types of social crises. But it
is a prominent faccor. Ineuqlaity contributes to social tensions
and land is in most soceities by far the most improtna of the
assets which a consdierable ahre of families either have or aspeire
to having. Uneuqla access to land is often asscated with and
mutually reinforing of ehtnic differences, class diferecnes and
political cleavages. When the gap between those with much land and
those with little corresponds to the difference bewteen two ethnic
groups and two clasees, the recipe i sin place for a very high
level of dissatisfaction, jealosuy, tnesion and, when the right     2 It is interesting to note that the Cuban Revolution arose
not in the context of particularly low average incomes in
agriculture but of a high degree of landlessness combined with a
high degree of seasonality of labour demand in the sugar fields.
The seasonally unemployed workers were a major factor in the
unrest leading to the revolution.
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spark is there and teh state is either two weak to ocntole the
violence or in the hands of one side in tah confrontation,
violence.
 A healthy agrarian structure provides its emergency-
preventing effects through several channels? First, by both raising
the level of agricultural output (including especially that of
food) and by improving the distribution of agricultural and overall
income, a land reform decreases the level of poverty, (defined
either in terms of absolute or relative income). Second, the wide
access to land ownership and control which an egalitarian land
system implies gives families more ways to smooth their incomes
over the course of the year and thus reduces the frequency of
seasonal food crises.2 Third, healthy agrarian systems in which
small farmers play the principle role tend also to have flourishing
non-agricultural activities, many carried out by these same farm
families (Ranis and Stewart, 1987). The reasons are discussed in
more detail below, but the impact is both to raise overall average
incomes and put the communities farther above the poverty line and
hence less vulnerable to economic or food crises but also, in
broadening the range of productive activities, to provide another
safety valve for situations in which there are negative shocks to
one important set of activities (usually the agricultural ones).
Finally, productive egalitarian communities are relatively free of
violence, much of which has its origins in inequalities and the
related povety, dissatisfaction and jealousy. They tend to be
socially efficient in that they are able to arrange more
effectively for the provision of public goods (education, health,
etc.), including crisis relief. Finally, the positive bonds which
unite families raise their proclivity to provide direct assistance
to each other in times of crisis, complementary with the public
provision of such assistance.
Teh ehaliet agrarain context (where this term is interpreted
as a little braoder than strucutre) includes also a healthy
relaionship bwth the rest of the ecoomy, including the governemtn,
in which public investemtn in infrastructure adn in research and
evelopmetn allows the secto to grwo and where neither it nor the
rest of the economy dominates policy in such a way that sectoral
exploitation occurrs. (Camboida fits here)
Unfortunatley, data leave no doubts that millions of families
in developing countries are landless or nearly so, that many live
in very bad and precarious conditions and that, accordingly, the     3  Land is of course only one (albeit usually the main)
possible source of income for rural families, so access to other
jobs can take the sting out of landlessness. Unfortunately data
are seldom available on both access to land and that to other
sources of income. But life expectancy figures and other
indicators of welfare leave no doubt that in today's world the
main victims both of chronic poverty and of emergency crisis are
those in rural areas. Whereas historically in the now developed
countries life expectancy was greater in rural areas (Easterlin, 
) than in urban ones, that situation is reversed in today LDCs.
     4  The neo-liberal wave of thinking in economics has
coincided with and no doubt contributed to a set of "reforms" or
trends favouring unconstrained rights to land and the Western
system of tenure. In Africa the "reforms' undertaken in Kenya are
perhaps the extreme example of this sort. In Mexico recently the
constraints which have characterized the ejido system have been
loosened with a view to improving the allocation of resources in
that sector.
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need for land reform remains great in many countries. FAO
compilations indicate that the purely landless population
(presumably among people living in rural areas but check this) rose
from 171 million people in 1980 to 180 million in 1985 (Alamgir and
Arora, 1991, 97). In Asia and Africa as a whole, one-third to one-
half of small-holders have to subsist on small holdings of less
than one hectare. Many are in marginal areas and have to support
relatively large families (average family size tends to be markedly
bigger in rural than in urban areas). Data on the inequality of
land distribution show no general trend in the Gini coefficient,
though this is a very rough measure of inequality.3
The pace of effective land reforms has clearly been very slow
since the early 1960s, by which time the East Asian "successes" had
already taken place and Iran's reform was in progress. Ethiopia and
Kerala (India) underwent significant reforms in the 1970s. But most
other efforts have been either of little significance (many
examples), reversed (Nicaragua) or not real reforms at all in the
sense used here of changes which increased the access of people
towards the bottom of the income distribution (Kenya, Mexico).4
Perhaps more ominous than teh infrequency of positive reforms in
recent times, however, has been the prevalence in certain parts of
hte world of the opposite--situaions in which vulnerable groups
have lost rights to land to more powerful groups, to the state
which then makes it avialable to cronies or to other favoured
groups, or to "the market" in cases where restricitons on sale have
been terminated.  Both in terms of its dierct impact on human
welfare, and in terms of its relevace as a determinatna of hte5
liklihood of CHEs, more ground may have been lost over the last
half cnetury to the varioaus fofrces which tend to deprive the poor
of land access than has been gained in the refomrs whcih ahve been
undertaken, and the greater concnern at this time may be to curtail
htese engative forces than to energize teh postiive ones, though of
course both are at all times relevatn and improtnat. That half-
centruy has seen the relative decline of the quais-feudal land
elites of many ocutnries, tradtioanlly the enemy of agalitarain
land distriubionts and of socia progress; land reform hs been a
factor in that decline in some cases and break-up of lands thourugh
the inheritance process has played a role, but more generally the
old system has lost ground becasue it is decreasisngly consistent
with the increasingly modernized, commercialized ecoomic strucutre
towards which economies have been evoloivng. Teh new and aggressive
agricultural elites which have been taking over from the quasi-
fuedals are commercial, often export-oriented, and increasingly in
favour with governemtns around the world. Thier pattern of
displacement of small farmers, pastoralists, and/or forest dwellers
is unconstrained by the sort of patron-client ties the quasi-
feudals have had with the pesant class; often their land grabs pit
them agaisnt organizationally weak groups, not in favour with
governemtn, and of at elast sometaht differnet ethnic group.
Sometimes the displacemetn is little more that a test of strenght
(as in teh case of the Sudan--see below); often it occurs in the
context of the "modernization, i.e. Westernization" of the system
of land rights from an original system hwich involved communal
rights to an individualized system. All such dispalcemsnts involve
soem degree of tension and nearly all involve some violence.
Whether they are likley to produce CHEs depends both on the extent
to which they push the losing group into povetty and desperation,
and on the extent to which the displacemtn itself generatees
hostiliity and violence directly. Sometimes there is a long dealy
between the intitla displacemetn and the ulimtate flare-up of
violence and CHEs. Teh roots of El Salvadors recent civil war were
laid by the 19th cnetury idipslaecment of indigenous groups by the
expanding ciffee indsutriy. In other Central American countries
such as Guatamala it was teh post World War II agro-export boom
which largely laid the base for the decades of violence to follow.
Many land struggles involve very uneven forces on the two
sides of the fight; in such cases poverty, malnutriiton and the
violence of repression are more frequent than is open fighting. In
other situations the contending forces are more equally matched,
leading more often to major confrontations, massacres, and CHEs.
Where two hostile ethnic groups provide the cleavage which defines
the dipute, as in WRwanda, this is perhpas especially lkley. Teh
underlying, continusin purpose of the conflict, howerver, is access
to land. In some instances long repression, povety and depseration
elds to civil war s in El Salvadro. Whever the contending forces
are or are preceived to be of comparable strength, the lklhod of6
war and associated CHEs is high.
This essay elaborates on the above relationships between land
access, land structure and certain types of emergencies. Section 2
reviews the evidence on the impact of land structure on incomes,
poverty and social structure. Section 3 looks at the record of
famines, epidemics, rural violence and other types of crises in
order to clarify the causal links with land distribution. Section
4 summarizes the main relationships identified.
2. Land Distribution and Small-Farm Policy as Determinants of
Income Distribution, Poverty and Vulnerability to Emergency
2.1 The Pressures for (and Obstacles to) Redistributive Land
Reform: Historical Perspective
"Entitlement", the phrase ultimately made popular by Sen (19
), sums up the problem of economic insecurity associated with lack
of guaranteed access to income of some sort. In poor societies the
main direct source of income is land, so it has always been the
case that access to it and the income it could provide has been a
central theme of society. Over long periods of time settled
agrarian societies (e.g. most of China) have tended to go through
periods of land concentration which would eventually produce a
crisis of poverty and insecurity; this, in turn, under auspicious
conditions would generate a peasant uprising, which might if
successful lead to a significant redistribution of land. As long as
poverty exists in developing countries, a significant share of it
is likely to be located in rural areas, and as long as this is the
case access to and distribution of land will remain a political and
welfare issue of the first order.
Access to land use takes a wide varitety of forms. In
geogrphaically fixed farming societies rights to the use of
specific plots of land for cultivation are cnetral. In apstoral
societiies rights to use are more natrually collective; this
pattern holds often in the cae of agro-forestry as well. Where
there are complicated interactions between pastroal and farming
socieits, ot in cases where the same group exercieses both types of
activity but at different times and palces, the pattern of access
rigths may be quite compicated, a prodcut of trial and error and of
compromise among affected groups. For presetn purposes it is
adequate to think of two basic systems--fixed cultivation and the
rest, the altter involving a range of structures and apatterns and
tending to be more complicated than the former. As a resutl,
governemtn interventons ar more liley to produce effects other than
those inteneded (whether for good or bad) through failure to
understand the system at hand.
The reasons for land reform and the pressures which
occasionally lead to it are thus near universal across countries
and over time. Long-past reforms responded to pressures very7
similar to those in evidence during this century and exemplify the
large social gains which come from successful reforms, the frequent
reversal of such social and economic gains, the tendency for gains
to be concentrated among families who are not the poorest, and the
frequent lack of complementary measures in support of reform
beneficiaries. The experiences of the Greco-Roman era illustrate
the alternating tendencies to concentration and reform. Solon, the
great Greek leader of the sixth century B.C. cancelled debts
related to land and prohibited the mortgaging of land or of
personal freedom on account of debt (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1973-
74, Macropaedia, Vol. 10, 638). In the Roman empire concentration
had occurred by the second century B.C. as a result of public lands
being usurped and concentrated in the hands of the nobility. Not
only did such concentration reduce the number of owners but also,
because it was accompanied by a decrease in cultivation and an
increase in grazing, it reduced employment and increased the
poverty of the peasants, producing a crisis. The reform process
begun by Tiberius (131 B.C.) was followed up by the Gracchi; they
attacked this usurpation of land and sought to return the public
domain to small cultivators, motivated by both sympathy for the
poor and concern with political stability. Naturally the nobility
resisted. After the murder of Gaius Gracchi in 121 BC the reform
was reversed within a decade and another period of concentration
set in.
The French revolution overthrew that country's version of the
medieval tenures which persisted in one or another form throughout
Europe. It freed all persons from serfdom, led to peasants taking
over the land on which they had been working and, in 1792, to the
cancellation of all payments related to land. Land in the hands of
the clergy and political emigrants was seized, but the terms of its
sale often favoured the wealthy and a new class of large landowners
arose among the supporters of Napoleon. Though feudalism was
destroyed and the new regime won peasant support, the economic
effects were limited since the tenants already had security of land
before the Revolution, size of operation did not change much, and
no facilities for credit or marketing were set up.
The Mexican reform of 1915 followed a revolution and dealt
mainly with the lands of Indian villages which had been illegally
absorbed by neighbouring haciendas. Though legally there was no
serfdom, the Indian wage workers or peons were reduced virtually to
that state by indebtedness.  Though a decree of 1915, reaffirmed by
the constitution of 1917, voided all land alienation which had take
place since 1856, loopholes, litigation and reactionary forces
slowed implementation and only after the Agrarian Code of 1934 and
the Cardenas administration did effective reform occur. But the
redistribution of land was not complemented by a substantial
program of support for the small ejidatarios.
In Japan, although the Meiji government (from 1868) had8
formally abolished feudalism and declared the land to be the
property of the peasants, usurpation by the rich and by
moneylenders had created classes of perpetual tenants and absentee
owners. In 1943, 66% of the land was operated by tenants who had to
pay 48% of product. Conflict between landlords and tenants was
widespread. After the war and the breakdown of the urban economy
the absentee landlords returned to the land. But the allied
occupation army instituted a reform, designed by experts for the
special conditions of Japan. It has proved very successful.
In Ethiopia maldistribution of land led to redistributive land
reform. When the population expanded into what is now the souther
part of the country the conquering generals and soldiers received
large tracts; a type of serfdom of the conquered gradually evolved
into share-cropping. In the 1960s as mechanization of major areas
led to tenant eviction the situation became critical. The
revolution of 1974 was triggered partly by this and the resulting
land reform established credibility in the minds of the rural
population (Bruce, 1988, 39).
2.1 The Expected Benefits of Land Redistribution for the Incomes of
the Rural Poor: Better Distribution of a Bigger Pie
Income distribution in an economy and in particular in its
rural sector depends on both the distribution of land by ownership
and that by operating unit. A relevant categorization of
agriculture-based families might distinguish rentiers (who do not
engage in farm activities but live from land rent), large farmers,
small owners, small tenants, and landless worker families. (Another
group, not relevant to the present discussion, are workers on state
farms.) The dividing lines between such groups are somewhat
arbitrary and differences are often matters of degree rather than
kind. Also very relevant to the implications of a given land
distribution is the extent of non-agricultural activity in which
various of these groups are involved along with their agricultural
work. In some systems there is a high level of landlessness
(families which neither own nor have access to land to cultivate)
and the most desirable (though not very frequent for political
reasons) form of land reform is the transfer from large owners or
the state (where it owns significant amounts of land) to this
group. Reforms more frequently involve many small (and perhaps some
not-so small) tenants whose problem is more the rents they have to
pay and/or the insecurity of their tenure to land rather than total
lack of access; in such cases reform usually gives land title to
the tenant. Sometimes, though less frequently there are few
outright landless and few tenants; the poor have land but too
little of it; in that case the logical reform transfers land from
large farmers or public lands to already-existing small owners.
As long as total output stayed the same in the face of a land
reform which decreases the concentration of land-holding, poverty     5 Higher average land productivity on smaller farms can in
principle come from higher yields for most crops or from an
output mix in which higher land productivity items have a greater
weight. Both are frequently observed. In many cases the second
factor appears to be the main one at work, however, as in
Colombia of the early 1960s (Berry, 1973).
     6 Since a negative relationship between size and land
quality appears to be fairly frequent (Bhalla and Roy, 1988).
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and the related vulnerability to emergencies would decrease since
the distributional impact would be positive. Most students expect
the output impact of land reform to be positive, or at worst
neutral, with the result that under a wide range of circumstances
a positive effect on the income of the poor is to be expected,
although where the positive output effect requires complementary
support by government and such support is not forthcoming, it may
not appear or may even be negative. The starting point for most
positive conclusions on this point has been the frequently observed
inverse relationship between size of plot and land productivity
(Berry and Cline, 1979; Lipton, 1983; Binswanger et al, 1993).
Factors contributing to that relationship include the greater
labour use on small farms due to the lower opportunity cost of that
factor and its higher productivity due to a less serious
supervision problem, the greater incentive to earn on the small
farm (especially relative to absentee-owned large farms of the sort
often criticized in the literature on Latin America); higher land
quality and greater proximity to large urban centres, and a few
other factors. When land quality is taken account of (by focusing
on efficiency units of land) it appears that the inverse
relationship remains generally intact (Lipton, 1993, 645). It is
usually accepted that large farms have the advantage of easier
access to credit and to technical information; one result of the
latter advantage has been their usually earlier adoption of new
higher yielding varieties of crops and the frequently higher yields
they achieve for specific crops. During the heart of the adoption
period for such varieties, the overall productivity gap in favour
of smaller farms has normally shrunk and perhaps sometimes even
disappeared5, but after such episodes it is normally present once
again (Lipton, 1993, 645). It has very rare for estimates to show
a rising land productivity by farm size (if indeed any have).
Although it is possible that this may occur on occasion when land
quality its taken into account6, the strength of such an
association would seldom be strong enough to throw into question
the expectation that a redistribution of land towards smaller units     7 The evidence of any link between tenancy and land
productivity is a good deal cloudier, with the empirical studies
(less numerous than for the relationship with size) throwing up
few regularities. Some findings are reviewed in Hsiao (1975).
With farm size taken into account in the analysis, most studies
find differences of only 10% or less by tenancy category (usually
in favour of owned farms).
     8 The isolation of land productivity as the relevant measure
of productivity is cleanest when labour is in surplus and other
factors are not important. Otherwise the situation becomes more
ambiguous.
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would have the effect of reducing poverty.7
Apart from the microeconomic evidence on the inverse
relationship between farm size and land productivity8, the benefits
of certain types of land reform receive confirmation from (or at
least are not contradicted by) the record of output and income
growth after their implementation. That record strongly suggests
that reasonably well executed reforms will not lower the rate of
output growth in agriculture and may raise it, as the microeconomic
evidence suggests. The most famously successful reforms are those
of Japan, Taiwan and Korea, all undertaken immediately after the
Second World War, and under pressure and/or assistance from the
U.S. government. After the Japanese reform output grew at 3-4% per
year over the 1950s and 1960s, with the land productivity increase
accelerating from 1% per year before the reform to about 4% after.
It remains a matter of debate, however, whether the outcomes would
have differed greatly in the absence of a reform (King, 1977, 199-
202). The Korean and Taiwanese reforms also saw quite satisfactory
output trends after the reforms (Ban et al, 1981; Lee and Chen,
1979). The picture, while less clear in the case of the two major
reforms of Latin America, Bolivia and Mexico (excluding Cuba and
the more temporary reform in Nicaragua), also seems to be positive.
Thus Eckstein et al (1978, 43) argue that, though there may have
been a temporary shortfall in Bolivia during the takeover of
estates and the associated period of turmoil, by the late 1950s the
average annual growth of output of potatoes, corn and rice from
before the reform were all quite high. In the case of potatoes,
where the pre-reform relationship between yields and farm size was
strongly negative, the rapid output growth continued through the
1960s as the small farmers applied high dosages of chemical
fertilizer to this crop. In Mexico, where the low incomes and
backward technology of the ejidal sector (created by the land
reform coming after the Revolution of the first decades of this
century) are frequently bemoaned, in historical perspective and
given the stingy government support the performance looks more
creditable (Berry, 1984, 78). According to Yates (1978) both land11
and labour productivity rose markedly on these farms between 1950
and 1970 (figures are less available for earlier periods), though
less rapidly than on small or large private farms. Similarly with
the land reform begun in Iran in 1962, which transformed a society
of extremely wealthy landlords and virtual serfs into a more
equitable system of small peasants, and though there was no serious
attempt to complement the land redistribution with better
extension, credit services or distribution of water rights, the
output effects seems to have been substantially positive (Aresvik,
1976, 96-100). The small and medium sized farms created in this
reform had productivity levels over twice that on large farms even
though a smaller percentage of their land was irrigated.
2.3 The Ideal Land Reform
The experience of history, both ancient and more recent,
provides clear hints on the sort of land reform which would be of
greatest lasting benefit to the poorer members of an agrarian
society. Its central features would include:
(i) relatively low ceilings on parcel size, both to discourage the
post-reform reconcentration of land and to assure as wide a
distribution of benefits among potential beneficiaries at the time
of the reform. Generally the best arrangement is one which
distributes all available land essentially equally among all
families, since this produces the most egalitarian result and since
it appears that the inverse relationship between size and land
productivity generally continues to hold for very small parcels.
For a very few crops economies of scale may come into play and call
for a different structure. A redistribution which leaves a
substantial large farm sector or leaves open the possibility of
development of such a sector (Bolivia, Mexico) runs the risk that
government dedication to the reform sector will be weak and that
sector will not get the support it needs to be productive.
(ii) implicit in or related to the first requirement, the inclusion
of landless workers as well as tenants among the beneficiaries.
Frequently this does not happen, most often for political reasons
(as in Kerala, West Bengal, Peru). 
(iii) a good package of complementary support measures in the areas
of infrastructure, credit, technical assistance, etc. Its presence
(as In Japan, Taiwan) or absence (as in Mexico, after the
revolution) is a major determinant of the output effects of the
reform and therefore of the degree of poverty alleviation which
results.
Most of the successful reforms have created small private
farms. In real life the main exception has been the creation of
state farms or cooperatives of one sort or another, reflecting a
belief in the existence of economies of scale or an ideological
preference for such units rather than small private farms. Both     9 Individualization has gone much farther in Kenya than
elsewhere. In central Kenya the process was associated with a
very successful period for smallholder agriculture, though it is
unclear how much the process contributed to this outcome. on
other coutns the strategy has not played out as expected (Bruce,
1988, 36). Kenyan farmers have largely failed to comply with the
legislation and where they have done so it is with objectives
different from those anticipated by its architects (Green, 1986).
The massive program of consolidation of land holdings, cadastre
and registration of individual titles begun in the 1950s was
expected by some to lead to a skewed distribution through sales,
but few expected those in charge of the adjudication process to
exploit it to appropriate land for themselves (Bruce, 1988, 44).
The failure of the adjudication teams to recognize secondary
rights in land was prejudicial to many, including major groups
such as women. Sales have not contributed to efficient
consolidation; plots purchased are often far from existing
holdings. Land is often bought as security for loans, for
speculation, or to hold for children's eventual needs; most
purchases are financed by income from non-agricultural sources
and do not create the hoped-for "yeoman farmers". The process has
been leading to new landlessness, some increase in tenancy and
major rural-urban migration, partly due to the landlessness.
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forms have tended to perform badly, for reasons which are
relatively well understood. 
The main exception in terms of what is desirability pertains
to those situations, now mainly in Africa, where some form of
communal tenure appears to operate relatively well and where rigid
application of the "western" model runs the risk of both lowering
output, worsening distribution and disturbing traditional practices
with meaning and value in the context of the society. Reyna and
Downs (1988, xi) argue that the decline in the productivity of
farmers in many African countries (or the slow growth of that
productivity) is in part the result of central governments which
have weakened or replaced traditional and highly effective systems
of land allocation and social life by favouring the
individualization and commercialization of land, by making
concessions of fallow land to the new government elites, favouring
the urban proletariat over the rural dwellers, etc. The new local
elites have transformed the traditional rules and conventions about
land tenure to new ones which work to their benefit.9
Inequalities in landholding in Africa have almost always been
of modest degree; the accumulation which takes place tends not to
be cumulative. In highland Ethiopia the indigenous system developed
its own ways of redistribution under heavy population pressure
(Bruce, 1988, 38). But where skewness has been severe its explosive     10  Other cases have been due to ethnic conflict and
conquest; the most dangerous are those where the subjected group
remains on the land in a servile status (Bruce, 1988, 39).
     11 This erroneous belief is shared, in one of the great
intellectual ironies, by both the supporters of big private
capital and by many socialists who support big state or
cooperative farms.
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potential has tended to be similar to that in Asia and Latin
America, e.g. the cases of the white settlers of Kenya and
Zimbabwe, which fostered people's movements.10 
Though freehold tenure was supposed to afford the security
needed to enable owners to make the capital improvements to raise
productivity, in fact access to land is less secure than under the
indigenous systems which focused on such assurance; the new system
leads to insecurity in part because of the continual and confusing
overlapping of the systems (Hobben, 1988, 18). Several careful
students of African land systems, whose views are presented in
Reyna and Downs (1988) feel that what is needed is a new approach,
showing much greater respect for the traditional systems and trying
to effect a good synthesis of elements of various systems and in as
democratic a manner as possible and one which takes account of the
needs of all participants.
Where access to land is a matter of bureaucratic discretion it
clearly can lead to concentration, as in Kenya and, earlier, in
many countries of Latin America. It does not appear to have done so
in Zambia; in Nigeria mishandling of allocations has led to deep
resentments (Bruce, 1988, 46).
2.4 Why are Serious Land Reforms so Infrequent?
The infrequency of the type of land reform which can so
effectively raise welfare must have several explanations. The main
and most obvious one is the opposition of the vested interests
(large landowners) who would lose. In most still-agrarian societies
they are the power group, regardless of the political structures
under which the country operates. But not insignificant roles are
often played by (i) lack of awareness of the actual or potential
productivity advantages of small farms--more often than not
agronomists and policy-makers have believed and still believe that
agriculture is characterized by economies of scale11; (ii) a
reluctance to tamper with rights to private property, even if the
property was accumulated illegally in the past, and an often
associated preference to avoid such extensive "intervention" as
these sorts of reforms entail, even though at the end the
presumption may and should be that the new private farms will
function at their best in a system of effective markets. The
attitude of the World Bank, the most powerful of the international14
development institutions, is illustrative. As Christodoulou (1990,
187-192) points out, the Bank has traditionally skirted this most
important of all desirable "structural adjustments" for reasons
which are essentially political. 
Prosterman, Temple and Hanstad (1990, 4-5) suggest that one
reason why land reform is not the subject of consistent or coherent
attention by aid donors or policy-makers in countries where
landlessness is acute may be the invisibility of the poor, and "the
issue arises in conspicuous form in only a handful of countries
each decade where revolt or famine grabs the attention of media,
the public, and governments. Yet awareness that it remains a
problem simmering beneath the surface in many settings could avoid
last-minute panic and help develop programs and remedies that would
replace this institutional inattention."  Christodoulou (1990, 144)
notes with unfortunate accuracy that "Agrarian reform is introduced
to meet a difficult situation--agrarian conflict. It is never
applied to anticipate problems. In other words, benign, advance
generosity or visionary zeal, or even wise providence, never enter
the equation." This is a sad but basically accurate assessment,
perhaps only exaggerated in the sense that more positive
motivations have been at least present if not definitive in a
number of cases.
Partial Successes 
Very few reforms have scored high on all three of the
conditions mentioned above. But many others still made notable
contributions to the social and economic welfare of poor, at-risk
people. Thus, Kerala's 1970s reforms benefitted former tenants but
not landless workers, and the support for the new farmers was
unimpressive. Sill, the impact was very important (see below). In
Egypt, Iran and Mexico (post-revolution) also, the reforms were
very imperfect and incomplete but still made significant
contributions.
Another set of partial success in raising the incomes of small
farmers involves cases where there is little redistribution of land
but strong support for existing small farms, whether owned, rented
or share-cropped. During the 1970s and subsequently, intensive
rural development programs were one of the policies many countries
considered as contributing to growth with equity in the rural areas
(Johnston and Clark, 1982). While success has been mixed,
reflecting different public sector capacities at responding to
small farmer's needs, some have clearly had a substantial impact on
the welfare of this group, as appears to have been the case in
Colombia (Ministerio de Agricultura y Departamento Nacional de
Planeacion, 1990). Brazil's small farms have also achieved a quite
substantial increase in productivity, for example over the 1970s
(Thiesenhusen, 1982???)     12 The recent debate on this policy in Mexico echoes that of
the 19th century in several Latin American countries prior to the
removal of the constraints on sale of land which formed part of
the reservations (resguardos) for indigenous people. their
removal paved the way for them to lose much of their land.
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Dangers of Failure or Misdirection
The pressure for land reform can be unproductive or even
backfire when the counterforces are strong or the process
ineffective. Several routes are strewn with negative effects and
outcomes, even when accompanied with success on some other fronts.
(i) A number of reforms--most notably that of Mexico after the
Revolution, but also Bolivia after its revolution, have been
partial in the sense of leaving the country with a significant part
of agriculture in the hands of large farmers or capable of being
developed by them. This may reflect an only partial victory of
reform forces, and/or an only partial dedication of the government
to the small farm sector. When this is the case policy support is
likely to revert to its normal recipients, the large farmers, while
the small farm segment is starved. In the case of the two cited
countries, the failure to support the small farm sector also
reflected the fact that the government remained dominated by non-
indigenous people and the small-farm sector was mainly made up of
that group or of mestizos. In any case, with little support in the
areas of infrastructure, research, extension and marketing
assistance, the small farm sector is certain to perform less well
than in might have, providing evidence in apparent support of those
who do not consider it to have much potential anyway. A mediocre
performance can eventually lead, as it has recently done in Mexico,
to a sort of counter-reform which removes constraints on sales of
ejido land, and in the absence of a ceiling on the size of
holdings, paves the way for a reconcentration of land.12 Given the
many forces which tend to favour large farms, it seems unlikely
that many governments will dedicate themselves strongly to assuring
the success of that sector if the large farm alternative is there
to be pursued. This "politics-based" reason for low land ceilings
adds to the technical argument in their favour.
 
(ii) Some reforms have achieved considerable socio-economic advance
for the rural poor or fairly poor, but in so doing have created
impediments to growth of output and productivity such that the
longer term performance of the sector is jeopardized. The case of
Kerala is an obvious example of this dilemma.
(iii) Lack of support for the new small farmers has plagued many
reforms, sometimes because of lack of political dedication to the
sector, sometimes through lack of resources or awareness of how16
important such support is.
(iv) The politics of land reform creates a vigourous search for
ways to evade the necessity, for political compromises which do
something to assuage the tensions arising from rural poverty and
inequality, but which are less painful to the large farm elite. In
countries with still unoccupied land, the natural candidate is
settlement, a policy pursued with varying levels of intensity in
some counties of Latin America, in Indonesia, in Malaysia, etc. (It
is of course an ongoing process substantially independent of public
policy in many cases--as In Brazil and the Philippines, so
sometimes it is hard to say where policy begins and natural
evolution ends.) Land expansion through settlement has been
important as a source of increasing output and employment in
agriculture in many countries. But in very few if any could it be
said that public policy to facilitate such settlement has provided
enough of a safety valve against the pressures of inadequate access
to in any serious degree substitute for a true land reform. Usually
the new lands are of marginal quality and/or too physically removed
from population centres to create a significant income possibility.
While settlement schemes have undoubtedly served as an escape valve
for social unrest in many countries; frontier areas are often,
among other things, a hard place from which to mount organized
protest against the centre, though they are often good terrain for
guerrilla activity. Since these schemes often have their political
attractiveness not in any clear evidence that they will make much
of a contribution to the landless farmers or to the country but
rather that they will allow the land-owners to avoid or postpone
the day of reckoning, they are frequently carelessly designed and
weakly implemented. Among the errors in design which lead to the
often disappointing performance of settlement schemes are: a
tendency to be too centralized in their administration, and
designed on the assumption that all settlers will succeed, which
never happens and leads to idle land and other forms of waste;
excessive paternalism in the form of constraints on crop choice,
technology, marketing or labour market participation, which are
either not enforceable or have negative impacts on settlement
success; choice of collective cooperatives, which always fail
(Kinsey and Binswanger, 1993, 1490). 
2.5 The Impacts of Land Reform and Strong Support policies for
Small Farmers: A Sample of Relevant Experiences
Although the historical record leaves it clear that the
objectives of what is above described as an "ideal land reform" are
not easy to achieve, it also leaves no doubt that the more
successful land reforms have been signal events in the histories of
the country or province/region where they occurred and that even17
partial successes can be very important indeed.
The experiences in Japan, Taiwan and Korea are most frequently
cited as coming close to the ideal, since they promoted equity,
contributed to growth (as best can be judged), and laid the
groundwork for vibrant rural non-agricultural economies (in varying
degrees among these countries). They put an end to rural unrest
where it existed (especially in Japan). Almost no one was left out
to constitute a continuing landless class. This latter outcome was
partly the result of the use of low land ceilings to the size of
holdings, and also in part to the fact that these were essentially
tenancy systems with most of the relatively poorer farmers being
tenants. The objective situation was an easier base on which to
build a strong and inclusive small-farm system than mot others. In
the dramatic case of Taiwan, where per capita income grew at over
6$% per year between 1953 and 1980, while the distribution of that
income was improving, the average income of families in the bottom
quintile was probably rising at close to 10% per year (Berry, 1989,
207). Contributing to this exceptional record was the earlier
investment by the Japanese in infrastructure and in research,
technical assistance and dissemination; the unusually high levels
of education, and the vibrant rural non-agricultural sector which
contributed greatly to the incomes of farm families, especially
those with the smallest farms (Ho, 1979).
The reforms which have been implemented in Kerala (India),
Iran and Egypt in the post-war period all fall well short of the
ideal but, as noted above, each had significant positive impacts.
The Kerala reform was the most radical, far-reaching and
comprehensive in South Asia and, because of the extent of its
success, one of the most interesting cases of the last half-
century. The puzzle of Kerala is why it succeeded in the absence of
outside pressures such as those at work in Japan and Taiwan
(occupation by a nationalist forces which had just lost  a peasant
war on the issue of agrarian reform on the mainland); outside
pressures from the national government have, in contrast, worked
against reform in Kerala. In addition, it is one of the few radical
reforms to be undertaken by a democratic government. The details of
this case are worth pausing on.
Herring (1990, 49) concludes that Kerala's experience
demonstrates the potential for fundamental alterations of agrarian
society in a positive direction under a democratic regime.
Legislation implemented in the 1970s effectively vested land in
tenants and abolished landlordism as an institution. It had
"historically operated as an especially oppressive and exploitative
system, depriving lower orders of rural society of political
rights, dignity, and basic human needs. These reforms could be
legislated and implemented because of the extraordinary
mobilization of a coalition of the rural poor and reformist urban
groups under the auspices of the local Communist party, which had
abandoned the insurrectionary path and functioned electorally much18
as a social democratic party in the European sense. The length,
intensity and staying power of that mobilization stands out as
anomalous in India." 
Agrarian radicalism has a long history in this state. Fear of
rural instability, related to unrest, evictions, and violence with
communal overtones date back to the early 19th century. Both
religious identification (Moslem) and ethnic identification
contributed to the coalition centred around the communists who
ultimately came to power. The leadership was unusually free of the
theoretical baggage associated with European Communism (Herring,
1990, 55). Kerala had been integrated at an early date into
international trading networks, and was therefore hard hit by the
depression of the 1930s, when the number of landless or virtually
landless agricultural labourers increased dramatically. Rural non-
agricultural activities are important, both in general and in the
case of the "agro-poor." A form of worker-peasant alliance was
therefore a natural.
The success of this reform can be attributed to a situation
extreme enough to generate great tension, to other contextual
advantages and to astute and effective leadership. On the first
count, the ratio of people to land in the state is three times the
Indian average; landlessness, tenancy and unemployment are high.
Locally, landlordism was extremely oppressive, the caste system
extreme (inapproachability along with untouchability), sexual
exploitation of poor women was common, as was serfdom bordering on
slavery (Herring, 1990, 56). The moral outrage produced by these
conditions was necessary to maintain tactical and substantive
radicalism. These forces were strengthened by the linkage of
agrarian issues to broader social ferment and demands for national
independence from the 1920s onward by a leftist group willing to
learn from experience and very dedicated to its constituency. The
fact that landlordism had been buttressed by and associated with
the colonial state helped. The quickening pace of commercialism had
disrupted society and heightened tensions. Various groups were ripe
to challenge aspects of the system. The Communist Party of India
opted for a platform emphasizing that the extraordinary promises
made by the Congress Party during the independence push could only
in fact be fulfilled by the communists. Over time, as it became
clear that Congress was unalterably opposed to major agrarian
reform and unlikely to fulfil a number of the other promises which
had legitimated their leadership, this platform became credible.
The Kerala reforms abolished the landlord-tenant system
completely, along with the institution of ground rent. All
cultivators were to be owners and there was to be no ownership
without cultivation (Herring, 1990, 59). A relatively low ceiling
(above which land would be expropriated) was set at 5 acres per
adult with total limit of 20 for a very large family, but this
netted little land since landlords has subdivided holdings or sold
surplus land in anticipation of a reform. The ceiling would have     13 The Communist Party's victory in the 1957 election, with
a programme of abolishing feudalism and generating capitalist
relations in agriculture, was the first step (Christodoulou,
1990, 145, citing Nossiter, 1982, 150). The Agrarian Relations
bill of 1961, after the central government had imposed
presidential rule was watered down to protect the landed
interests. Real agrarian reform was implemented by the second
communist government's 1969 legislation.
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had greater effect around 1960 had Congress not dismissed the
government after the Communists first electoral victory and given
the landlords another decade to dispose of and subdivide their
properties.13 The reform affected about 43% of the non-plantation
land in the state; tenants were a quite significant 43% of families
with interests in land. Though the state's acquisition of land over
ceilings permitted only a modest number of new farms, attached
labourers also benefitted from house or garden site provision,
which has proven important in allowing production of food for home
consumption and hence improving nutrition. State land, though low
quality, was distributed in small parcels of 0.26 hectares.
Implementation of the reforms was a continuing struggle, requiring
both legislative tinkering and massive demonstrations, though
violence was no more than is typical in Indian elections (Herring,
1990, 60). A split in the Communist Party actually energized the
process, as the left wing communists in opposition mobilized the
tenants and landless to keep up the pressure on the often
recalcitrant bureaucracy and the government; without this element
Herring (1990, 61) concludes that the implementation might have
moved with the sluggish and corrupt manner typical of reforms in
the region. The courts were a major obstacle, as vested interests
drew on top lawyers to gut key provisions. But such opposition, and
that from the central government in Delhi, was met by mass pressure
made potent by the widespread literacy, effective local organizing
of the underclasses and extensive politicization. Newspapers were
widely read and their exposure of fraud made it harder to
perpetrate.
Tenancy was abolished with comparative ease. Rent arrears were
scaled down. Landlords had strong incentives to comply in order to
begin to receive compensation; some cut deals with tenants, fearing
that government compensation would not come. That compensation was
rather low and, with the effects of inflation, this meant that the     14 On the other side, some landlords were reduced to
destitution, as the money was slow to come through and those who
were pure rentiers were not well positioned. 
     15 The Kerala communists ran the considerable risk of
eroding their electoral support through granting property rights
to tenants, who might then be expected to shift rightward to the
Congress party. The West Bengal party opted not to grant such
rights, partly it would seem for that reason.
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beneficiaries did well.14 It appears that benefits were rather
concentrated among the larger class of tenants; holders of more
than 2 ha. got 64% of the redistributed tenanted land. This led to
some disaffection and anger among the landless. 
The Kerala experience is of special interest because much of
value was achieved even though such helpful conditions as positive
outside pressure were not present and none of the three criteria
for an ideal reform were met. This and the fact that neither the
Indian nor the Kerala economy are on the sort of fast growth path
from which Japan, Korea and Taiwan earlier benefitted, leave the
magnitude of the long run contribution of the reform open to
question. Will it ultimately be judged the single most important
event in Kerala's socio-economic history, because its important
short-term benefits paved the way for subsequent progress, or will
those short-run benefits erode under the continuing pressure of
population growth, still-strong caste divisions, and slow economic
growth?
Though not deserving a full score on the first criterion of
low ceilings and as equitable a distribution of land as possible,
the reform stacks up better than most.15 Both the lands from the
ceiling expropriation program and state properties were distributed
in very small parcels, defensible both in theory and by the
evidence from the results. The exemption of plantation crops (tea,
coffee and rubber) on the (doubtful to the point of implausibility)
grounds of economies of scale, severely limited the impact of the
expropriation program. It was consistent both with directives from
Delhi and with the communist's ideological tenet of coming down on
rentiers rather than capitalists, which in fact were in principle
to be fostered. Further, the plantation workers' unions did not
want land division but rather nationalization to make them state
employees (Herring, 1990, 64). The danger of reconcentration or of
failure to stick to the "land only for farmers" criterion are
present though not yet very serious. It is true that too much land
is held by people with other sources of income. Although
cultivation is organized by the owner it is sometimes done in a
perfunctory fashion (Herring, 1990, 70). 
The record on inclusion of the landless was not good, though     16 Implementation of KAWAS does remain dependent on local
militancy and the priority placed by the government, which varies
across villages.
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less bad than in some other reforms. The main source of exclusion
from benefits in terms of land access was neither a too high
ceiling defining expropriation nor too large parcels provided to
beneficiaries, but the definition of "tillers" as those who took
the risks (advanced cash for production) rather those who worked
the land. This decision had its political roots in the fact that
tenants were the key players in the local leadership cadres, but it
contributed to the fracturing of leftist unity after the reforms.
The party had promised land to tenants for decades. Unfortunately,
the conflict between labour and farm operators is greater than
elsewhere in India; even very small farmers hire in a great deal of
labour. In the long mobilization leading to the reforms there was
emphasis on the unity between these two groups, with the
implication that the labourers also would get some benefits when
the necessary first step--ridding the state of the landlords, had
been achieved; they were the shock troops in the struggle (Herring,
1990, 65). Their subsequent disaffection was strong. Many felt that
they had not gained at all and that the larger cultivators had
deserted the party after they got what they wanted; they resented
the new consumption patterns of the former-tenants. The result was
a series of quite militant strikes in the 1970s, leading to the
Kerala Agricultural Workers Act of 1974, a remarkable piece of
legislation which limited the work day to 8 hours (from the
previous 12), established a minimum wage, and guaranteed permanence
of employment for attached workers. It was seen as providing
security to the labourers and softening the looming conflict before
it became violent (though in fact violent confrontations did
ensue). The farmers, however, were infuriated by this set of
measures whose impact could be to cancel the benefits achieved by
replacing tenancy with ownership. Ultimately the unfolding of the
politics in this situation defended the landless against exclusion
from benefits, but did so in a way which is injurious to future
output and income growth. Though some embittered labourers
disagree, Herring (1990, 69) notes that the new owners are quite
different from the previous rentiers. "...the fear is gone" from
their lives. "Labourers remain dependent on others for access to
the means of production, but agrestic slavery, acute social
humiliation, and oppression have been obliterated or dramatically
reduced by social processes of which the land reforms were the
central part". "....the conditions of genuine participatory
democracy and protection of human rights at the local level have
been firmly established" (Herrring, 1990, 73).   Like few
counterparts in the developing world, these field labourers have
assured old age pensions.16 Meanwhile, tenants got the rights but22
encumbered by a lot of obligations. 
On the third requisite, the Kerala reform comes off least
well. To the extent that the support system for small farmers
depends on the national government (as it does in part) this is not
exclusively Kerala's fault. But redistribution did take precedence
over production in the reform. It left behind a sort of stalemated
class conflict, with neither party strong enough to take charge and
push things forward in a rational way. Strikes and lockouts have
disrupted production, and owners sometimes leave land fallow to
teach the workers a lesson. Yields have risen very slowly in spite
of new varieties and modern inputs. Unemployment in the state
remains at 25%. Employment opportunities in agriculture were
declining during the 1980s. Stagnation of the paddy sector was
partly explained by labour control problems; in this irrigated crop
labour needs to be available for water control at all times; now it
works by the clock (Herring, 1990, 71). Private investment is
discouraged by low profit levels, and social investment by the
party's attempt to maintain some degree of social peace by picking
up the tab in a way which cuts into the investible surplus. Being
a state rather than a country raises some costs (apart from Delhi's
outright opposition to reform), since capital can be outwardly
mobile to other states. More credit and extension services would
have expanded the benefits to the new owners and improved the
investment climate, but the pressure for their provision was
diminished by the bitterness felt by the labourers, whose local
organizations would have been a natural local conduit for such
pressure. Thus the reforms did not solve the agrarian crisis in
economic terms, nor turn a deeply caste-ridden society into an
egalitarian one. Although the cultivators are more involved in
agriculture than were the landlords, they have used more of their
new-found wealth to upgrade their social status than might have
been hoped. 
  Will land finally pass to the real tillers, as some of them
expect? Herring (1990, 68) doubts that this is consistent with
electoral politics and coalition strategies. In India as a whole
cultivators outnumber labourers, and though the opposite is true in
Kerala the fact that non-agriculture is atypically important in the
state's economy means that only 28% of the total labour force are
agricultural labourers.
The Iranian reform is described by Christodoulou (1990, 151)
as a white revolution to prevent a red revolution. The country had
been emerging from oriental despotism through the early part of the
century. A society of extremely wealthy landowners virtually
controlled the lives of the vast majority of landless peasants;
when the reforms started in 1962 80% of the farming population were
sharecroppers or landless workers and the landlords periodically
redistributed the sharecroppers holdings in order to reduce their
security of tenure and independence (Aresvik, 1976, 97). They23
received up to 80% of the crop, plus free labour and other services
in off-seasons. By the mid-1970s about 2.3 million families with
perhaps eight million hectares had been directly benefited. Land
cultivated by the owner, either with machines or with hired labour
was exempted from expropriation. The reform did not attempt to
settle landless workers and there are reports that some were
displaced. Nor was there a serious attempt to complement the reform
with better extension, credit services or distribution of water
rights. To summarize, though it was far from perfect this reform
did reduce the powers of the large land owners and create
landowning classes who would form the base for both small and large
capitalist farming. The measures were facilitated by oil revenues
which consolidated bureaucratic control over all classes, and
presumably would not have been possible without those resources. 
The Egyptian reform of 1952 is the most comprehensive one
outside the communist countries (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1973-74,
Macropaedia, Vol. 10, 640). At the time, 7% of owners had over two
thirds of the private land and 77% of all holdings were less than
one acre, tenancy was widespread and rents were exorbitant. The
reform expropriated land above 100 acres (the first limit was
higher) and gave it out in parcels of up to 5 acres (except for
college graduates who got 20). It was implemented quickly and had
a positive impact on the morale of the peasants as well as on their
income and status. But total output was not much affected; this
agricultural system was already an intensive one. After the short-
run increase incomes remained low. This qualifies as a case where
without an industrial takeoff soon afterwards, the benefits of the
reform tend to erode and be lost over time.
Nearly all of the other reforms one can cite have achieved
less than would technically have been possible, through failing to
meet one or more of the conditions for a high degree of success,
usually for political reasons, sometimes complemented by lack of
understanding on the part of decision makers and/or strong
ideological bents.
Most of the "reforms" undertaken in Latin America, famous for
the degree of inequality in the distribution both of land and of
income, have been small (relative to the size of the problem),
designed to create "middle-class" capitalized farmers, and hence
having little or no impact on the rural poor. In Brazil, the
country with the largest group of poor people (see Morley, 1995) in
spite of its high average income, as of 1991 the country had 3
million rural holdings but half of them belonged to just 58,000
owners, in fact probably to considerably less than this. The call
for reform "has grown thunderous" thousands of squatters, have
invaded farms and ranches, often encouraged by trade unionists,
left-wing politicians and even Catholic clergymen (The Economist,
April 13, 1996, p.38). President Cardoso has taken up the banner of     17 Such as Bruce Johnston  (personal communication).
     18 It is interesting that the U.S. Agency for International
Development (AID) has been, at least at times, more supportive,
as during the 1960s and early 1970s when the Alliance for
Progress was important and the threat of social upheaval in Latin
America was of great concern to the United States.
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agrarian reform and promised to settle 280,000 families by the end
of his term in 1999. The invasions, originally planned in secrecy
and carried out at night have since then become quite open. Many of
the squatters have been tossed off their plots in the past three
decades as machines and more modern methods of farming and ranching
spread. The opening of the borders to more imports is estimated to
have eliminated half a million jobs in the countryside since 1990.
2.6 Land Reform Policy
Policy to promote effective land reform faces many
impediments, as outlined above. Improving support systems for
already existing small farmers is a much more feasible target,
though still a far from easy one to achieve. Many prominent
students of agrarian issues17 have concluded that the reduction of
rural poverty will come much more from the latter approach than
from the former, given the constraints and challenges faced. These
are political (first and foremost), ideological, institutional and
informational.
The lack of support from the World Bank and the regional
development banks illustrates the institutional problem. As the
pre-eminent international institution focusing on development
policy, the World Bank's views have been pivotal.18 On the other
hand its small farm policy has become more positive over time.
Until the early 1970s the Bank provided assistance to large
agriculture, and even to large scale mechanization, at a time when
research was making clear both the advantages of small farms and
the employment consequences of large scale, capital intensive
agriculture. After evolving away from its embarrassingly ill-
informed diagnosis of this period, the Bank has come to share the
mainstream views on the role of small farms. But taking the
additional step of supporting their creation through redistributive
land reform has not come easily, although indirect support has been
provided in some cases; for example, Bank aid for rural development
in Northeast brazil was passed on to the local authorities in the
form of support for infrastructure only after they had obtained and
distributed land as per the agreed on plan (Lipton, 1993, 652).
This helped to induce large owners to make voluntary contributions
of land in return for irrigation benefits on the land they would
keep (Tendler, 1991).     19 The limited historical evidence available does suggest
some prospects for direct use of market and tax incentives to
move land into the hands of smaller farmers, as in the case of
Ecuador, but the effects were not large (Zevallos, 1989). 
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Both the views of the Bank and of other institutional actors
have been affected over the last couple of decades by the
optimistic position that much of the good which such a reform can
produce may be obtained with less damage by helping farm size
structure to evolve in favour of small farms by less intrusive
interventions than confiscatory reform e.g. progressive land taxes,
removal of the subsidies from which large farms have typically
benefited in the past, and the strengthening of small farm support
policies which are themselves non-distortionary, such as better
access to credit for poor farming families (Lipton, 1993, 649).
The lack of broad institutional support for making agrarian
structure a policy variable is symbolized by the eye-catching lack
of easily usable statistics on that structure. On a matter of
pivotal importance to the welfare of so many in the world, the data
on trends in access to land and on the inequality of its
distribution are, to put it mildly, sparse. The FAO undertook a
compilation of agricultural census data a quarter of a century ago;
since that time no comparable effort has been made, in spite of the
frequently voiced fears that the Green Revolution, the
commercialization of agriculture, technological change, the
declining influence of indigenous tenure systems, or other factors
may have led to significant increases in concentration. Useful
figures are, of course, available for a set of countries which
undertake periodic agricultural censuses but these are a clear
minority of all countries.
What of the potential of a more market-friendly approach to
achieving a more equitable distribution of land? As with all such
broad questions, one must wait for the record to unfold to be
sure.19 But there seem few grounds for optimism that such
approaches, as they are likely to be used in practice, will have
more than a marginal impact on agrarian structure. In an impressive
look at this issue in the context of Chile and its "exclusionary
agro-export growth" Carter and Mensah (1993) model the agrarian
structure and the likely response of various categories of farm
groups to two of the widely suggested instruments to achieve a
better distribution of land. They conclude that even without the
destabilizing impact of stochastic shocks, peasant farms face a
large competitiveness gap in the land market. "...land market
reforms which leave untouched the structure and rules of access to
factor markets, thus face a daunting task" (ibid, 1097) Land
mortgage banks may have some promise, while progressive tax policy
appears much more limited in its potential impact. A basic problem     20 An extension or implication of this problem is that,
while improving access to credit by improving land markets so
that land can better serve as collateral has obvious advantages,
the other side of the coin is that it lowers the security value
of the land. Where a farm family's socio-economic security can be
assured through some mechanism other than the guaranteed access
to a piece of land, because that land is inalienable, both
objectives can be served. A strong rural non-agricultural economy
obviously helps but that usually comes after the strong agrarian
system has already 'performed". 
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is what Binswanger (1987, 1091) describes as the "fundamental
financing problem of poor people" the fact that to borrow money to
buy land with all markets perfect and scale neutral technology
requires curtailing consumption below what one could earn on the
labour market."20 Allowing for market imperfections which make
labour cheaper on family farms, Carter and Mensah find that very
small units may survive because the land is worth a lot to
guarantee employment in an unpredictable labour market with
unemployment but after this effect has worn off the reservation
price of land falls starkly with size over a range because of the
capital constraints on using additional land. 
Without traditional confiscatory land reform, the new
approaches are unlikely to make much difference. When complemented
by such traditional reform, they may have greater value (Lipton,
1993), partly through the "threat effect" which can make landlords
more flexible in the face of expropriation.
Removal of legal constraints on land subdivision is a minimal
enabling device (Lipton, 1993, 651). Credit schemes may need
ceilings to become operative, and run the risk of raising land
prices to the point where the former owners lose little or even
gain and of cheating by the powerful patrons who get access to such
credit though various forms of chicanery, as in the case of Kenya
(Lipton, 1993, 651). Removal of subsidies favouring large farmers
or their crops can be a valuable supportive device for credit or
land laws to help the poor, and can be nudged along by the fiscal
stringency faced by so many countries. Lower subsidies helped
discourage the rich from subverting reforms in Northeast Brazil
though other positive steps were also taken there.
Regardless of the views and practices of the international
agencies, rural poverty will continue to exert pressure for land
reforms. If the new approaches to modifying agrarian structure
prove ineffective, the traditional one is likely to come again to
the forefront. If so it is to be hoped that not too much time is
lost or unnecessary poverty suffered in the interim.
Teh coutner-land refoms of recent times will take a while for thier27
efect on welfare adn on CHEs to be felt. Mexcio, Africa, etc.
2.7 Defense Agaisnt the Loss of Existing or Traditional Rights of
Access to Land
As noted earleir, in some situtiaons the politicla and plicy
issue is whether a progressive land reform will take place or not,
and wherther, accordingly, some amrginalize families will be made
better off thereby. In many other contexts, however, the issue is
whether those groups are losing ground through their own and the
state's failure to defend theri current or past rights. Though here
the need is for maintenacne of the staatus quo (or soem acceptable
modification to it) rather than "refomr", the arguemtns are
remarkably simialr to those for refrom, as outlined above.
Typically the efficiency and risk-reducing benefits of tradiaitonal
alnd systems, not too mention their value as part of cohretn
soscial systems, are underestiamted by propoenets of alternatives;
currently the favoured alterantive is the Western-style system of
indiviual alnd rights and free land markets, i.e. no constraitns on
purcahse or sale. Often the rhetoric in which this contrast of
systems is couched is more than anything else a screen for a way to
take land from its traditnal users and give it to someone else--the
powerful intrests which form the governmetn or are in favour with
it. This pattern extends from Central America to Sub-saharan Africa
to many other parts of the world. Many of the (bgenrally erroneous)
arguemtns used against the break-up of large farrms through ladn
reform ar here marshalied in favour of the need to create new
larger farms and get the land away fromt he inefficinet trational
farmers. As might be expected, the primae vicitoms of these trendas
are groups with no politicla voice, oftem amrginalizaed ethnic
groups. Where governmetns are themselves central to the "land
grab", menaing that they lack the legitimacy which would come with
concnern for all of their citizens, there is little to be dsicussed
about such situaionts; experts can only try to throw the spotlight
on them and describe than fro what theya re--land grabs. Where
governemtna are more neurtral and amenable to arguemtn, there may
be some hope that their expterts will come to a fuller
understanding of the situiaon. In the case of equalizing land
refomr, and even more in that of proviiosn of decetn support
systems for smll farmers, teh quantitiative evdience on the
relative efficiency of smaller famrs appears to have had at least
some influence on the views of policy makters and polticians,
though the intuitions of most non-expoerts have always tended in
the other drieciton and the wieght of reasonably edcuaitoned
opinoion did not chagne for a ocuple of decades after the evdience
started to come in from India. Teh process will perhaps be aven
slower and more difficult when the issue is the relative
perfomacnes of tradiaiotnal land systems and the Western system. In
the case of alnd refrom, the key discussion in fact surrounded the     21 The American College Dictionary defines famine in
alternative ways, some implying that the basic problem is a
general lack of food ("extreme and general scarcity of food") and
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relative prodcutivities of small and large farms and on this there
was eventually ample evdience, farily easy to colelct and
udnerstand. Meaninglful and persuasive evidnece on the reletive
efficiency of alnd systems is likely to be harder to come by.
Although numerous experts ahve been soudning the alarm for at elast
a couple of decades now, the porcess of Westernizaiton has
continuded without, it seems, a grat deal of professional debate in
most of the coutnries where it is happening. Teh ideological
component underlying the neo-liberal policies remains strong and
tends to crowd out analysis. Thus in the case of the "refrom" of
land marekts in Mexico, what one too often hears are the simple
text-book arguetmns for free marekts, with no recognition that both
hsitorialcal expereinces in Mexcio and in other coutnries provide
soem evdience on the other side, as does a more careful analysis at
the mcreconomic levvel, especaily when it takes into acocutn the
transiotns processes. In the debate arund farm size and efficency
the issues were esentailly econommic, involving factor market
imperfeciosn, economices o scale, etc. An appreciation of tradional
land systems is subtler and hence even more likey to escape the
alrady ethnocentric veiws of many "refomrers."
3. Relevant Characteristics of Humanitarian Emergencies
The relevance of land reform as preventive of serious
humanitarian emergencies lies in the fact that it creates
conditions under which both famines and rural violence are less
likely to occur.
Famine and policitical conflict tend to go togehter and to
reinforce each ther. Should we separate them at all?
3.1 Agrarian Reform and Famine
The work of Sen (19  ) and others has helped to clarify the
factors which contribute to famine and the resulting suffering and
death. Although obviously related to a general shortage of food, as
everyone's intuition suggests, they are also related to the
distribution of purchasing power and of capacity to produce food
for one's own needs. The phenomenon of some degree of starvation
and malnutrition in economies sufficiently productive to keep
everyone easily above the poverty line were inequality less marked
is well enough recognized. When, instead of involving a small
percent of the population, that lack of capacity to either produce
or purchase for oneself extends to a significant proportion of the
population, it constitutes a famine.21others focusing on the outcome ("extreme hunger; starvation").
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The likelihood of mass starvation may usefully be viewed as
the result of four determinants: the average level of income and
productivity in the society; the typical level of inequality; the
extent of fluctuation in purchasing power in the society as a whole
and especially for the poorer part of it, which depends in part on
fluctuations in local production and in part on the extent to which
prior reserves or current borrowing can be used to smooth such
fluctuations by buying from other countries or regions; and the
extent to which better off members of the society are able and
prepared to help those less well off, especially in situations of
crisis like that of a famine. A famine is a crisis of capacity to
get food, by production or purchase. An absolute shortage of food
contributes to it by increasing the scarcity of food and raising
its price (if markets are the sole arbiter of its distribution). A
high level of inequality contributes to it by pushing the capacity
to obtain food lower for some unfortunates than it would otherwise
have been. And a society which lacks either the capacity to provide
mutual assistance to its weaker members at such times (e.g. because
the poorest are geographically remote from everyone else) or the
willingness to do so will fail to avert crises that could be
averted.
In many famines each of these "weaknesses" is present to some
degree. As noted earlier, a strong small-farm agriculture is likely
to be the best possible preventive since it raises total
agricultural output; it usually implies that a higher share of that
output is of basic foods (as opposed, for example, to export
crops); it often involves a mixture of agricultural products and
helps to generate a vibrant non-agricultural rural sector which
further increases the income earning opportunities of the
populations; and it tends to go with a strong social network which
is likely to improve the likelihood of mutual assistance. Although
such assistance is by no means unknown or even uncommon in patron-
client situations, it appears to be less pervasive and predictable
than in small-holder societies.
(Discussion of several of the major and better studied famines in
developing countries, and the extent to which each of the above
positive features broke down.)
Teh regresios of Nafziger and Auvinen hsow slow food
production per capita grwoth to be a source of humaniatarian
emergenices. Odf course since Africa is the region in difficultyuy
and it has the bulk of the CHEs, htis may not be as illuminating as
it apperas at frst glance ot be. Would need to take Nigerai out of
thees figures since its problem was in part Dutch disease. Between
1960 and 1988 Indias' food prodcution tripled from 50M tons, while
SSAfrica's was esetnailly stagnat at that level (47).30
Teh deteriorating food position began befreo the droughts int
eh SAHEL (1968-74) and can be traced back to colonialism (EIcher
and Baker, 1982, 20-23, cited 48) Teh continuing crisis is due to
African governemtn neglect of agriculture. After indiependence
African pliticak eleites needed to buy the support of urban elitesa
nd working classes rather than smal-holders (47). Within
agricutlure the payoff was with comemtcial and export=-oreotned
agriculture. Also jsut inertai from the colonial period. Project
based polieices preferred to price based ones as it halpes to
create patron-client system (48). Highwasy and steel mills rather
than water pumps, tube wells, etc. (48). There is an invere
rlatioship bwteen farm size and land yileds due to low imputed
costs of own labour an monitoiring (Cornia, 1994, 217-29, cited,
49). But a policy bias in favour of the alrger farms. During the
liberalization of trhe 1980s and ealry 1990s the WB, IMF and donors
set conditions of agriculturrela policy with emphais on getting rid
of distroitions. empirical stdueis suggest tehes comprise only a
fraction of the explanantion for the falling output per person
(49)_. Infrastrucural and research deficits, tenure insecturity and
teh very inefficient new private commeciala griculture (favoured by
urban elites), and others. Teh emphaissi on individual property
rights by IFIs and African elties has reduced efficiency (49).
Registering individualized alsn titles lowers secutrity int he sort
run as it increases the number of alnd disputes. Shapries take
advagnteg eof the innocnet and less well connected to increae thier
registrations. Women especially face diffiucltires in having their
traditional rights recognized by the political authorities. Kenya
as a case i point during the individualized titling since the 1950s
(50). IN Nigerai extensive tracts were gratned to friekds of state
officiairls (50). These redistribuions contriubted to teh invere
association as well as lowering labour intensitiy, cpatial
formation and innovation.
Dispution of food trade by domestic politic conflict
contirbuted to millions of deaths in Aftica (5)). Food defictis of
course conribute to refugee problesm.
Sen's "entitlement" approach which includes poliical pressure.
Teh Indian system does not react to chronic maluntutirion but does
to severe fmailne, The Cahineses repsonse is raterht ther
oppositse; much less chronic problems, but less repsonse to
criticia siutuaions because of confidnec dogmatism and lack of
plicitcal oppositoin (51). Teh poliical economcy apaproach goes
beyond Sen's (sahred by most schalrs and interenational agencies).
in allowing for possible state action to remove netitlemetns from
certai gorups, e.g. the soviet gffamiines of the 1930s (51).
Over 1992-92 all the coutnries with the hgihest numbers of deathes
(over 10,000) were in FAfrica excpet the former Yugoslavia
components (3).
Ake describes state-making as the euqivalent of primaitive31
accumulation but more violent, a matter of conqeust and
subjugation. REvoking teh autonomy of communties. (cite, p. 52).
Rurling elites look for local collarboratiors and can allow these
to exploit local popuatlions in treturn (52). de Waal, dufield and
others this se famine more as a matter of tradnster of reosures
from the politically weak to the plicitally stoeng, in which case
it is best view as part of the war or conflict itself.
Margnalized groups in wothern Somalia (Dinka) becasenm destitute
not only from drought but from the fact that the state strippped
them of cattel and other major assets (Dufield, 1994). See his good
quote re asset trandsfer cbecomeing cultural genocide. Famine is
usualy the reuslt of the dirsruption of a way of life--note this
may also be vs. Homer-dixon. Teh state often withholds faile relief
from certain victoms, as in the case of Somalia. In contexts like
these the dsitirubion of land is jsut part of the bigger puzzle,
but it is at he elast symbolic of he struggle since land, cattle
etc. are the survival necsessities.
Military coups are often direct precursosrs to CHEs (54) 
Norman, David W. (1997) "The Failure of Agricultural
Development and its Linkages to the Urban Economy" paper presented
at UNU/WIDER-Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford meeting on "The
Political Economy of Humanitarian Emergencies" July 3-5, 1997,
Oxford.  In the typical case with emphasis on food self-
sufficiency, there has been too much emphasis on getting the
output, regardless of how or by whom.  "food security at the ntiaon
and household level necessitespalceing greater emphaisis on th
"who" and also the one relating to "how" if there is concnern about
teh food secrurty gaol being sustainable in the long run." (16).
Although those tresponssibe for technolcy development have been
somewhat senstive to differnces across econlocigical settings they
have bee far less esesitive to the socioeconomic componcet of
differences across farmers, until the FSD appraoch (which had as a
basic principle the incorporation of the famers into the process).
The resul, apart from wated research, was tha the better endowed
farmers, in both of the above rspects, were the big beenficiaries
and the result was increasing ineuqlaities (17).
We could add the experience of the North American indigenous peooes
to htis.
3.2 Agrarian Structure, Rural Violence, and CHEs
Rural violence is the second major form of humanitarian
emergency which arises with some frequency in agricultural
societies. Chronic, systemic violence can be serious; our main
concern here, however, is the outbreaks which create more general
emergencies. These tend to take the form of guerrilla wars--pitting
rebels against the state, which may turn into large enough affairs     22 In their cross-country regression analysis Nafziger and
Auvinen (1997) find that CHEs are more likely in settings of high
income inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient). The same
result is reported by Alesina and Perotti (1996). 
     23 A major study of such peasant wars is that of Wolf
(1969).
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to be called revolutions, and of ethnic, class or other forms of
organized violence in rural areas. Often the class backdrop to
violence overlaps with the ethnic component.
Clashes over wealth are one of the most pervasive sources of
violence in developing countries; some would say that they are at
the root of almost all such clashes. Since land is the principal
asset, it is also the principal source of tensions and conflict in
many situations, from outright agrarian revolutions to chronic but
severe rural violence, to a variety of other manifestations. 22
Most twentieth century revolutions have been linked to
agrarian inequality (Edelman and Seligson, 1994, 446). This was the
case with the Mexican Revolution of the early twentieth century
(Katz, 1988) as well as the "peasant wars" in China, Vietnam, Cuba,
Nicaragua, El Salvador and others.23 Wolf (1969) argeud that the
great revolutions of the 20th cnetury wre fundmantaly repasnat
wars."various parts of the world peasnastirs--subsistence oriented
agriuclutrral producres subjected tot he authoroty anbd economic
exactions of a state, or a landed calss of overlaords, or both--
fced the destructive advance of cpatialist relations and values."
(4) Cpaitalisms advacne udnermined the peasnats' access to land,
resources, and sociopolitical mechnaims they normally needed to
sustain their way of life. IN Mexico, Russia, china, vietnam,
Algeria and Cuba, peasantires rose up in great defensive
mobilizatons that made revolution necessary and possible."
Ironically, in shattering the old order, the preasnats facilitiated
the rise to pwoer of revolutionary groups, poiitcla parteis, and
states whose interest in soicsl trnsfrotnation might, in the end,
hasten the peasnst' own destruciton or subjugation." 
If there is a simple recipe which acocunts for a large number
of rural conlifcts it involves two components: a large group (or
groups) aggeivreived becasue of alck of access to land, and a
sufficintly even balance of power between this group- and its
opponet (whether the state or a land-owingin eletie, the
combinaiton of thee two or anohter aggreived group). Since the
grups in conflict are usually ethnically different or can be made
out to be, this fetreu is also very common. Whereas teh sense of
injustice and aggreivement was present aong the indigenous groups
of El Salvador was presnet from the time of their displacement over33
a century ago, the timing of its 20th cnetruy explosions relate to
the severity of the objective situtiaon and th weakened state of
the oligarchy (in the ealry 1930s) and to the fact that a by then
strong guerrilla movement in the 1980s felt it had a chance to
defeat the trational powers (se belwo). Landsberger (1969, 25)
conlcludes that peasnat movemstns start when "Tradiotnal elites
objectively weakened and weakinenong also in the 'will to
govern'...permit some peasnats to impprove some aspects of their
status." When the Mexican revolution broke out the Diaz regime was
weakenend by inefficiency and corruption (rife in teh army (Brown,
1971, 193, citing White, 1969). Brown conlcudes that "there is
probably enough despair, andger, perceived relative pedeptriaiton
and 'consciousness' to start an uprising in most any tradiaitnla
rural communtiy in Latin America on any given day.....Thus whenver
the local landed elite begins to lose its grip, usually becaseu of
larger eocnomic or polcitica circumstances, peasnt activism springs
up rather wuickly, often with little or no initial debt to outisede
agitiation." (194-5). Debate about the contribuion of the peasants
and teh outisders and intellectuals i bolivia.
IN Mexcio Zapata's agraristas waged a nine year war with three
successeive governemtns, and succeeded in gaining officil
acceptacne of Zapata's land rerom program, but even then the lands
were only actually redistiruted in those areas wehere the peasnats
were strongly organized and armed. Teh pace has been a fcuntion of
the strength of peaants movements; at one time during the Cardenas
afdministraiton the armed peastn milita numbered 60,000 men who
defended onot only thier land but also the governemtn, which was
under strong pressure from conservative froces (196). Militant
diret action by peastn groups in Norhter Mexico led to another
spurt of reform activity under Lopez Mateos (196).
Land invasions in Cochbmab triggered the boliiva reform in
1953 (196). In that coutnry that MNR supported and hleped to
psrpead it to other regions, which was not the case in Mexico,
where the counterpart of MNR was not there. Vigorous ommovements in
other coutnreis such as isoloated reigns of Peru and 'Colomcai have
succumbed, partly for want of support from strong, urban-vbased
policitial movements (196).
Bolivia;s elite ahd been stripped of her rubber plantatiosn,
sea coast and Chaco claoims. After teh latter defeat there was a
pwoer vaacuum in which peasnt groups and npther new interest groups
began to thirve.
In Venezuela, Betancourts; organizers bega to recurit peasnat
influentials to form sincidatos in 1936. As presidenat of the
revolutionary jusnt (1945-47) he accelerated teh pace of peasant
organiaziaont and acarreid out an agriarian refomr, little known,
whihc greatly increased the pwoer of the peasnst leaders (Powell,
1969, 66). Teh 1948 miliary coup reinstituted ehavy repression and
paeastn eladers were murdered, tortured and exiled and
improsiononed. (197). They survivied to help topple this regime.34
It is useful for present purposes to distinguish among four
types of potential conflict situations, based on differences in the
direct origin of the conflict and differences in the degree to
which changes in land structure might help to alleviate the
problem. Many conflicts are the result of attempts by powerful
interests--whether private or state or the two together, to
dispossess traditional land rights-holders from their rights. In
these cases the "solution" to the problem--in the sense of the
outcome which would normally be best from the point of view of
overall societal welfare and reduction of conflict, would be a
clarification and defense of those traditional rights. In other
cases the source of conflict is the unequal distribution of land
and the pressure from those with little to increase their share at
the expense of those with much. Here, the natural solution is an
equalizing land reform. In a third type of situaiton, the direct
problem is not inequality, since the conflict involves two or more
groups not defined by current landholdings but by, say, ethnic
group. Such conflict cannot be resolved directly by land
redistribution from large to small. Finally, where there is a high
level of tension due to land scarcity, but not much inequality,
then redistribution is not the answer either; such a society has no
alternative but to seek an increase in land productivity or to find
employment opportunities outside the agricultural sector if it is
to soften the conflicts. In both of these latter two situations,
though, agrarian structure does matter when it is defined broadly
enough to include security of access to land, since clearly defined
and predictably enforceable rules are important to avoid conflict
in all situations. And agricultural policy support for small farms
clealry matters in all cases, especialy the last one. 
Tensions around land are thus more likely to arise when it is
unequally distributed, which leads to pressure from those with
little, or when the instituions and mores surroundig its
disribution do not prevent land grabs by some of the more powerful
agents from some of the wearker ones. These tensions between groups
defined by their level of access are more likely to break out into
open struggles and/or lead to high levels of violence and hence
directly to CHEs when neither of the contending sides is able to
greatly outweigh the other and subdue it before violence and CHE
gets out of hand. In cases where the state is a potential arbiter,
its strength is a key determinant; a weak state raises the
likelihood that ethnic and other types of violence will develop
farther. In many cases the state is on one side of the battle in
any case, however. Sometimes two states (e.g. national and local)
are in conflict on land issues.
Uncertainty contributes to violence and to CHEs in various
ways. Where there is a lack of clarity with respect to who has
rights to land, or if it is not clear that other parties will react
firmly to any attempts to change the status quo, there is an
invitation to aggress. Uncertainty and ambiguity is especially35
characteristic of property regimes either in transitions or with
competing and overlapping systems, true of much of the world where
a traditional property rights system co-exists with a particularly
recent Western system of individual property rights.
Whenever the basic conflict over assets is compounded by class
differences, ethnic differences, religious differences or any
combination of these, the likelihood that it will escalate into
full-scale warfare and lead to a CHE is heightened. These latent or
actual suspicions, dislikes and hatreds can be mobilized by those
who are pursuing the goal of asset acquisition; this both increases
the likelihood that conflict will break out and that it will be
hard to rein in. It also increases the cruelty likely to be
displayed and decreases the humanitarian impulses which might
alleviate some of the costs associated with the conflict.
In many crisis situations of the sort under discussion the
main tensions are between groups, of the sort defined above. But in
some cases there is also a high level of intra-group tension,
dislike and opportunistic behaviour to greatly compound the other
lines of conflict. When not even within the group is there a
maintenance of mutual support and pulling together, then many weak
individuals will be particulary at risk, the loss of control,
civility and order will be greatest and the likelihood of CHE the
greatest.
Many insights into the nature of the links between land issues
and CHEs come from the more notorious examples of the latter. Many
CHEs, inlcuding the majority of those in Latin America and many in
Africa and elswehre, have grwon out of a history in which
populaitons were dipslaced from thier lands by interlopers, leading
both to long-standing resetnments and to extrmes of wealth and
poverty, and sowing the seeds for later uprisings and violence. The
recent CHEs of several Central American coutnries are among the
most recent, with those of El Salvador and Guatamala the most
dramtic--El Salvador's reently ended 12 year civil war claimed
about 75,000 lives while four decades of armened conflict in
Guatamala have killed about 100,000 (Pastor and Boyce, 1998, 4,
citing World Bank, 1995). In all of these cases agraarian
structruea nd the need to reform it was a hot poitical issue. Teh
derailing of the plannd 1955 rerom in Guatamela by the CIA
interventon contirbuted to decades of continuous violence in that
coutnrey. Some countries, like El Salvador and Nicaragua, did wind
up hainvg some sort of reform, but in no case was it early enough
or complete enough to lay a healty base for socio-economic
stability.
 Teh roots of El Salavardos conlict date to the altter half od
the 19th cnetru when it bacem a major producrer of cooffee. Most
ofthe well-suited volcnaic slopes o cnetral ane western El Salvadro
were held by indigenous communities as communal propoerty (Pastor
and Boyce, 1998, 5). Such property weas abolished by state decree
in 1882; by the turn of the centruy the communiteis had been36
forciably evcited and the best coffee alnds converted into
latifudnia, owned mainly by the so-called 14 families, who formed
the apex of one ofo the most inegaliatrain patterns of land
dsitirubion in the world. The groups pushed off now provided
seasonal labour to the estates, while working the rest of the year
on their minifundia. Teh coffee oligarchy often deployed miliatry
force to mainatin rurla law and order and to supres sintermittent
peasant revolvtes. The most serious of these occurred in 1932 when
the Great Dpresion pushed coffee prices odwn and the employers cut
wages and employemtn; 10-30 thousnad people died in the massacre
which followed (Pastor and boyce, 1998, 6). Military governemtns
kept the lid on brewing tensions, driven by the severe ineuality of
income and of access to land, until 1979 when a modernizing
military coup, undetaken partly with a view to fending off a
revolution, mixed progressive steps inlcuding an agrairina refomr
law to nationalize the arge estates with soem repression (Pastor
and Boyce, 1998, 7). Rather than resolve the land problem, these
steps triggered a dynamic which led to civil war, as detailed by
Pastor and Boyce (1998). Befroe teh reform phase which would have
most beenfitteed the peasantry or most harmed teh coffee oligarchy
was reach, the process was cut short, reprssion was heightened and
teh revolutionareis prsuded that only by a military victory could
they achieve their goals. Among the elelemtns of the peace
progvcess were a modest papraoch to problaems of ineuqlaity,
inlcuding ladn transfers to ex-comabatnats and FMLN supporters
though these hav involved long delays. Land refom of th needed
scope never occurrred. Eventully the ladn issue will fade into the
backgorund as El 
Salvador becomes urbanized. Buthe ladn problems will ahve
contributed mightlity to the CHE dealths. As in all civil war
coutnreis, there was a serious erosion of law, order and secturity.
A coomon featrue in all of the Cetnral American experinces of
rural vilence has been the displacment of poouations when their
lands become valuable to others with more political power, usuallay
in the context of new export opportunities. In El Salvador, as
noted, this process occurred mainly in the 19th cnetruy. Anothe
wave occurred in Central America after WWII as cotton and beef
exports grew quickly in Guatamala, Nicaragua and other ocuntries of
hte region. Many peasnats were driven off their land as epxort
agriubulture generated "zones of explusion" (Bulmer- Thomas, 1987,
161 cited p. 20). As in teh cae o El Salavador, these countries
suffered "reactionary despotism," which genrallt received help from
teh outisde--U.S. intervention to put down the Sandinista upising
of 193???? and to block the Arbenz agrairarin reofrm of 1954.
Foreing involvement becaem less reactionary with the coming of the
Allinance for Progress in 1961, although the wave of reforms
adopted int eh wake of the decalration of Punta del Este were
mainly cosmetic (Barraclough, 1994, 18), but even the fatct that
the IFIs have finally accepteda sort of role does not imply any37
serious chance of major refomr; given the conservative ideology
currently ruling in those agencies it more likley defines an upper
limit to the possiboe efects they may have, via such low influence
steps as provision of low cost credit fro land acquisition of the
poor.
Mexico's early 20th cnetruy agrarain revolution fits teh same
mold as the more recnet Central American tragedies. It was
immediately preceded by a sweepgin concoidation of rurla holdings
between 1880 and 1910 which "detached an ever-increasing number of
peasants formt eh land zandx crated a new class of agricultural
wage laborers" (Reynolds, 1970, 136). Teh previous combinationof
haciendas and small subsitence plots held by indians or mestizos,
together with the innately lazy and unproductive Mexcian peasnat
himself, were held jointly repsonsible for the backwardmess of
agriuclture in the coutnry. Accoridngly, teh governemtn supported
this enclosure movement, "in which fedreal land and paeasnt
communal hldings, as well as other private porperties with culded
titles, were redistributed to provate aldn developmetn companeis
and to individuals successful in gaining favour with the
adminsitraition." Until about 1985 the impact of this
transformation on rural incomes was disguised by teh posotive
imapct on wages of improving terms of trade for agriuculturral
expoertas. But when rrual real incomes began to fall after that
date and the uran demand for labour also slipped, the agriarin
relfom movmeent was sparked, especaily in the states which had
preivious experienced a high degree of commercialization and land
consolidation (137). Pressures mounted for a return of those
communal and private holdings which had been taken over; the




The experience of Northeast Brazil historoically fits in this
pattern, more broadly defined. whereby grwoth based on export of
certain items tends to make the poor worse off, depending on the
mechanism. 
 None is more tragic than the cases of Rwanda and Burundi. André38
and Platteau (1997, abstract) conclude that, together with the
terrible heritage of ethnic conflict between the Tutsi and the Hutu
groups in Rwanda was a high level of intra-group violence, which
contributed greatly to the magnitude of the tragedy. On the basis
of an in depth case study of a densely populated area in the
Northwest of Rwanda (1988-93) they conclude that "acute competition
for land in a context of slow growth of non-agricultural income
opportunities has resulted in an increasingly unequal land
distribution and rapid processes of land dispossession through the
operation both of the (illegal) land market and the evolution of
indigenous tenure arrangements. The pervasive incidence of land
disputes and the threat of landlessness have led to rising tensions
in social relations and even within the core of family life, thus
paving he way for more and more overt expressions of disharmony and
violence. A connection between these ominous conditions and the
civil war that broke out in 1994 is established." Land
concentration and rising poverty occur not only through
disequalizing market transfers but also through the "gradual
erosion of customary social protections following the
commoditization of land"--when acquired through the market land
becomes exempt from customary rules and restraints (2). In that
setting the Malthusian trap can result in bitter tensions within
families, intra-community hatreds and violence, and strong social
questioning of (backlash against) the evolving regime of market-
allocated individualized property rights (1-2). Obligations to
redistribute land in favour of land scarce kin cease to apply when
land is purchased instead of handed down (34); this holds for
sisters and even for children. Distress sales of inherited land
makes the transition from the one system to the other. Loss of
family land to strangers is a major setback to be redressed as soon
as circumstances allow, but only 6 of 247 transactions were
retrieval in character, so not much was going on (35). Increasingly
the indigenous tenure arrangements are drawn exclusively so that
return migrants, divorced women, orphans, etc are being kept out
(35). Widows are especially victimized for fear that  their
children will become land claimants. The desperately poor people
who steal to live and are more or less tolerated and distinguished
from other thieves (34).
According to some reports, land distribution remained
relatively equal until the early 1980s (30), but then the change
appears to have been rapid. André and Platteau argue that there has
been a rise in intergenerational inequality of holdings, tough this
is not clear from their table.
The area studied was characterized by a high level of tension
and conflicts and violence (31). When these lead to litigation, the
result is often a loss of land. About 40-45% of conflicts were
around land issues--succession, transactions, boundaries, etc. A
third were conjugal and the rest a variety (33); the authors claim
that these figures understate the share due to land issues because39
these often underlie other conflicts. They question the findings in
another region which put land conflicts quite low relative to other
causes (33). The most disquieting form of conflict is intra-family
between father and sons. The traditional form of inheritance was
patrilineal, with land going to elder sons to hold in a sort of
corporate ownership, with the understanding that he would grant the
younger sons enough land to subsist (38). As land got scarcer,
direct transmission to all sons became the norm, though the elder
son now got an additional share. Early apportionment among sons is
now the norm (39), e.g. each son gets his share at time of
marriage. Elder sons may resist the withdrawal of lands over which
they had previously been granted use rights (39). And sons may
pressure the father on the grounds that he has kept too much for
his own use or against his rental to non-family members. The
tradition of the youngest son taking care of parents has largely
fallen into disuse (it got that son an extra share) so the father
now feels a need to keep more for himself (40). Parents feel
neglect and abandonment in their old age. Conflicts of sons with
"caring strangers". Feelings of total vulnerability by some old and
weak persons; many just let themselves die (41).
The situation was increasing difficult as early as 1988--more
disputes, more violence, atmosphere of fear and isolation and an
increasingly uncontrollable group of young thieves and delinquents,
often but not always landless youth without earning opportunities.
This village was part of a region especially rocked by the
violence in 1994. It especially resented the Tutsis, as they had
been implanted by the Belgians, replacing their own authorities.
Though the civil  was started by macro-political forces
cynically playing on ethnic divisions in order to retain power, the
land-based conflicts went a long to setting the stage for violence
and allowing it to spread so quickly and devastatingly.Quote from
austin might be sued (43). Those who died were disproportionately
people with relatively large loanholdings or people considered  to
be troublemakers (44) or who behaved opportunistically , e.g.
acquired land through off-farm earnings but did not redistribute.
The troublemakers included those suspected of poisoning, or being
violent. Almost half of this group died vs. 5.4% confirmed,
overall.) So the war provide an opportunity to settle scores or to
reshuffle land properties (46). The one Tutsi (widow, with large
land) was the first to be killed. quite envied. The poor,
especially, children also dying greater than average proportions
(46).
The case of Rwanda is rendered especially difficult, on the
one hand by the immense population pressure resulting from first
population growth and the lack of development of other sectors and
on the other by the history of ethnic violence. But it is
noteworthy that the erosion of the traditional system of land
rights has contributed greatly to dispute and conflict, both
directly through the way it deprives groups of what would under the40
old system have been their rights, and because of the uncertainty
it breeds. Possibly the erosion is mainly a function of the extreme
degree of land scarcity. Andre** and Platteau note that in Kenya
most smallholders, even after registration of land title, do not do
the things that registration seeks to empower them to do, such as
selling or mortgaging the land without consulting family or
neighbours (cites) (47). In Rwanda they do those things, and this
has conributed both to the marketization of ladn and the many
tensions and robelsmassocaited with it. Here private property
rights have emerged even in the absence of state-led registration.
The security of land transactions is reasonably high. But land
disputes are common and contentious. The "adaptation paradigm"
people like Bruce and Atwood argue that compulsory and systematic
titling is justified only when the customary tenure system can no
longer deal with the situation in an effective way, as here.
Perhaps no system would work too well here though. Modern courts
are "considered by ordinary people as bodies manipulated by rich
and well-connected individuals."
Klugman (1996) notes that "Earlier historical factors,
together with growing inequality and major land pressure in recent
decades, suggest the potential for a humanitarian emergency in
Kenya. such an emergency would follow an outbreak of large-scale
group conflict in the country."....increasing poverty and
inequality in the context of economic decline and severe population
pressure has been associated with the marginalization of
significant numbers of people" (1). 
The various rifts in Kenyan society. Intra-ethnic conflict can
be as great as that between groups, e.g. intra Kikuyu (6). IN the
main agricultural regions, where 60% of the people live, the main
distinction is between small farmers and large ones, a division
traceable back to colonial times (6). 
Land FIGURES MOR CNETRALLY IN THE LANGUAGE O PLLICTICAL
CONFLICT THAN IN MOST aFRICAN STATES (wEEKS AND yOUNG, 1996, CITED
13). 86% of Kenyans are i rural areas (13); is this true? One of
the few African coutnries that undertook widepsread adjudiation and
titel progrmames (13) Poitical and eocnomic eleites ahe been able
to get large tracts of land. With popuaotion grwoth the average
size of landholing fell quickly over 1982-1992 from 4.9 acres to
4.0 (14). Much subdivision thorugh inheritance. very fast in some
poor areas. Lanlessness not common but very small plots are.
Much movemtn of cultivortoas, espeicalyy Kikuyu, onlto lands
claimed and used by pastoralists, typically thorugh individual
purshces (14). Teh Masaii lands have shrunk substantiatlly. Some
stduies indicate tht registration has lessen land disputes while
tohers report the opposite (15)
Keen (1997) Notes theat the aaim of many actors in civl wars is not
to overthrow or maintain a particualr system but to circumvnaviagte
the law in order to realize some immediate material gain, so war
dovetails with crime (3). Picking on unarmed civiliasn often easier41
than confronted armed opponents. Forces civilans to joined armed
gangs for own protection (3). REbellion porvides a cover for all
sorts of crime. Continued esitence of a revbellion may legittimate
authoritarian or military rule (4). Many things the in-group does
are technicaly legal only becasue that group has jsut rediefinced
ti to be so, e.g.  military's right to raid private hourses in
Sierre Leone (5). Where groups feel that are not likley to be
protected by law they may take protective coutermearuses. Cnetre
groups which cannot rule without the collaboation of t local elties
may have to give them license to unetake the sort of violence they
prefer (6). In teh sudan's second vcivil war, trders and landowners
fror the north have been given the  to vilently appropairate
fertile land in th Nba Moutnreian region; this has consolidated
support for reht regime in Khartoum (6). Simialr i Somalia aunder
Barre (6). IN Aire and Iraq the regimes have sougt to build support
among particualr families, clans and ethnic gorups by granting them
eocnomic priveleges that include the firight to inflict violence
without redress (6).
iMPROTANCE OF SETTLING OF SCROES, AS IN sERBIA (7). mOST SUCH
RESENTMEENTS PROBABLY RELATED TO SOICAL AND ECONOMIC INEUQLAITIES
(7). tHUS RURAL sERBS RESENT URABAN MIDDLE CLASS mUSLEMS WHOSE
POSITIOSN THEY FLET WERE OWED TO COLLABORATION WITH THE tURKS (76).
Rural Cambioidands resetned the ruan dwellers for selling out to
the Americans and their bombing campaign.
Teh Central american CHEs have typically grwon out of history
in which populaitons were dipslaced from thier lands by
interlopers, leading to extrmes of wealth and poverty and sowing
the seeds for later uprisings and violence. In nealry all cases
agraarian reform was a hot poitical issue. Teh derailing of the
plannd 1955 rerom in Guatamela by the CIA interventon contirbuted
to decades of continuous violence in that coutnrey. Some countries,
like El Salvador and Nicaragua, did wind up hainvg some sort of
reform, but in no case was it early enough or complete enough to
lay a healty base for socio-economic stability.
 Pastor and Boyce note that El Salvador's reently ended 12
year civil war claimed  about 75,000 lives while four decades of
armened conflict in Guatamala have killed about 100,000 (4). The
cuases of conlfict cneter on the distriubvion of income and land
and the oligarchi structreu of per. Teh roots of El Salavardos
conlict date to the altter half od the 19th cnetru when it bacem a
major producrer of cooffee. Most ofthe well-suited volcnaic slopes
o cnetral ane western El Salvadro were held by indigenous
communities as communal propoerty (5) Such property weas abolished
by state decree in 1882; by the turn of he centruy the communiteis
had been forciably evcited and the best coffee alnds converted into
latifudnia, wowned mainly by the so-called 124 families. Teh reuslt
was one fo the most inegaliatrain patterns of land dsitirubion in42
the world (5). The groups pushed of f the land becaem "free" to
work on the sestates, but much of the need was just for the
harvest; the rest of the year they worled on minifundia. Teh coffee
oligarchy focussed on keepig labour chepa, often deploying miliatry
forces to mainatin rurla law and order and supres sintermittent
peasant revolvtes. As the Great Dpresion pushed coffee prices odwn,
the employers cut wages and employemtn, contribuing to a preasant
reovlt in 1932 (6). Marti helped with this uprisisng, which was
however quicky crushed with oss lf 10-30 thousnad people in the
matanza which followed (6). Military governemtns kept the lid on
the brewing tensions; there was only one elected presentditnet
between 1932 and 1980. Eventaully leftist and other forces began to
consider the need for armed revoluiton. A modernizing military coup
of 1979 was partly to avoid revolution; it incorpated some
reformist civilian leadrs (7) and beahved in a somewhat
schizophrenic way, mixing soem repression with some progressive
steps, inlcuding an agrairina refomr law to national ize the arge
estates (7). Too littel too late, but did weakern the traioanal
eleites, some of which repsonded with "death squands" to target
leftist leadrsa nd community organizaers. Teh FMLN conlcudes the
only route is vilence, which breaks out.
Ineuality is generally concneded to have played a significant
roloe in the Salvadorean tragedy, and nearly everyone agreess this
ineiquality was driven by land tenrue; Seligson (1995, 44) rated it
one of ht five most extreme cases of land concnetation. It
contirubted to low rural incomes, migration to urban maretk and
resetnment. Teh FMLN found greatest support int eh coutryside (9).
Teh agraiarin freorm of the 1980s was not enought. It qukciky took
15 % of land in the nealy 500 largest properties of cattle as well
as sugar, cototn and coffee ranches (benefitting 40,000 familes) in
a few months; two additional phases were to take another 40% over
a much longer period. Thes edonadn (25% of land) woul dhave had a
sharp impact on coffee sectro but was not implemented, hwile the
third pahse would h ahve allowed peasuants to buy the smlal [lots
they were renteing. (here just 5% instead of 25% weas transferred
(10).
Witht eh incomplete refomr went increasing repression of
opopualtist forces--even non-violent leaders began to fear and went
into exile. Teh land refomr was seen by some as a maniplative move
to derail a more progressive agencda. Also the FMLN was convinced
int eh early 1980s that it could win a militry ocnlfict against
what seemed an unpopualr goverenmtn (11). Teh outside involvement
frustrated athose expectations. Both teh miliatry govenemtn and
Duarte in 1984 decided to go for a miliatry cosolution (11) with
U.S. support. By 1989 the improtance of tht radational landed elite
had delcined, partly the reustl of the rural civil war (16).
Among elelemtns of the peace progvcess were a modest papraoch
to problaems of ineuqlaity, inlcuding ladn transfers to ex-
comabatnats and FMLN supporters, microeneterprise and houhseinf43
assistance fro ex-combatatns and some expension of poverty
eallevaiton programs(17). Teh purge of the army ocrps was delayed
and require strong internatial pressure (18). Land transfer also
involved long delays. But 1994 elections were genreally peaceful.
Land refom of th needed scope never occurrred. Eventully the
ladn issue will fade into the backgorund if SEl 
salvador becomes urbanized. Buthe ladn problems will ahve
contributed mightlity to the CHE dealths. As in all civil war
coutnreis, there was a serious erosion of law, order and secturity.
A coomon featrue in all of the Cetnral American experinces of
rural vilence has been the displacment of poouations when there
lands become valuable to others, usuallay in the context of new
export opportunities. In El Salvador this process occurred mainly
in the 19th cnetruy. The experience of Northeast Brazil
historoically fits in this pattern, more broadly defined. whereby
grwoth based on export of certain items tends to make the poor
worse off, depending on the mechanism. 19th cnetruy El Salvarodr is
tpical of hte negative one.  Anothe wave saw the benefits of
Central american grwoth after WWII--notably cotton and beef, very
unenvenly distirubted (20). Many peasnats were driven off their
land as epxort agriubulture generated "zones of explusion" (Bulmer-
Thomas, 1987, 161 cited p. 20). All threee suffered "reactionary
despotism." All three had historeis of resisitence and violent
supression, with outsied involvement in the other two (21).
Although the IFIs have finally accepteda sort of role, a lack of
plitical will was present int eh limited alnd transfer programme i
El alvador (29). Partly becasue gov't uneasyu about titaling land
to former miliatry opponents. In Guatamala negotiaiontson to end
the interminable civil was took the form of a erioes of spearatee
accords (32) with one on agrarina issues. Teh IFIs seem to ahve
taekn a mroe pro-active role tna in El Salvador (32). Teh IDB dn WB
presetn at 1995 discussions on soci-economic and agrarina accords
(32). Teh governemtn has poegded low cost credit fro land
acquisition of the poor.
Although Coomiba's periodoic waves of great violence,
unquenstionalby faling in ghe CHE cagtegory, are most comonly
atributed to teh long standing and deep political conflict betweent
eh two parteiss (Liberals and Concservatives) and more recently to
the presence of the illegal drug indsutry, ladn issue s have here
too played a considerably greater role than meets the eye. Roldan's
stdy of teh vioence afflicting the Uraba region of the dpeartmetn
of Antioquia-still one of hte most vilent corners of hte country,
shows the extetn to which, although the political party conlfict
label has been attcched to it, the main roots had to do with the
control of natural resources. She notes that vilence in Antioquia
was not widepstpread but rather ocncnetrated int eh phaysical and
cultural peripehry, places like Uraba, middel magdalena dn lower
cauca. And teh state appleid coercive measreus  only in areas
regrded as part of the frontier like Uraba, which were considered44
to have grwoth potentail but where the authorities and investors
worreid about their tenusou influence and control (4). Migration
adn colomnizaiton also increased conflict for resoruaecs between
distinct forms of cultivation and trade. Winds up in a battel
betwen adherents of the parteis or as somthing interpreted in that
way. Economic and social conflicts fed into poitical ones
involveing politial pwoer and patronage (4). Teh cnetal authoririty
views teh ergionsa s serving its own interests. A miliatry report
in 1950 notes that those who complained of guerllia presnece wher
those with lvery large propoerties; feaer of extrotion more than
partisanship spurred the rumoutrs of impending disorder (10). TEh
collaboration between hacendados of the two parteis agaisnt
vabndals and agaisnt resentful persons fromt e poorer groups int eh
same party (19). "Partronage and violence were shaped by eoncomic
intersts, not jsut partisan loyalty, while class could divide
memebers of the same party....." (20) Liicit proetection rackets
organized during La Violencia undleie the goon squadas and so on of
todiay in Uraba. Access to albur became dirrectly linked to a
matkert in influcnes; need for false documentation for workers,
etc. In 1951 the Governor relinquished atuhotrity over the area to
the military which trned it into an occupied area. (20)
Colonialsm concpet at the cnere of all this. Ideas of
extractive wealth, poitical domination and ucltural subordination.
In Antioqui, the cut betweent eh borugeois code of values and theat
which devaites (5). Set of characterisitics whcih came in popualt
cnetral thought to characterzie the "other". I wonder if the
strenegth and pride of Antioqueno culutre goes, as in the case of
Japan, with a heightened disreadared for others. Difference elided
with devaince, etc.
Tehinks of a "regional hegemonic projcet" (7) constructed and
deployed byt eh regions's menof ciaptal adn poliical leaders. Teh
concnept of the "imagined community" helps to udnerstadn the
process.
Advet of violence in Uraba toudched off panic among Antioqia's
elite and policitacal ladres; jsut as the Carretarea al Mar
pormised to bring theis rich aea under their control for capitalsit
developement, the Urabenos exploded in furious asualt agaisnt the
Antioqueno authorities (8).
In Latin America the ultimate full circle irony is the case of
Mexico. Teh political party which gre out of th Argrain revolution
of the early 20th centruy was some decades later the support for
the political and lan hdolding eleites against which teh Zapatista
uprising of Indian small-holders nd landless workers or cmapensions
in the state of chiapsas took place.
Most of the cited Latin Amcieican expericnes support 
Fairhead's (1997) view that conflicts are less generalted by
reosuece ascarcity than resource wealth. Though teh most dramiatic45
of such conlficts often involve mineral wealth (Zaire, Nigerai and
many others) land is a frwent factor.
In the first wtwo situaitons described, however, ladn
strcuture has a lot to do with teh potential resoution of conflict.
Teh Cambodian tragedy has very special featrues, in cluding
the imapct of colonvilism, ethnic cleavages, and involvement in
geo-political conflicts, but it nonetheless appears that a number
of unhelthy fearutes of th rurla scoio-economyc were contributing
factros. After independecen economic develoemtna nd agriculture
were erratic (Billon and Bakker, 1997, 10). Large foreign-run
foreign plaantatiosn producing for export continued to dominate the
(10). Benefits of grwoth not poroperly channelled through the state
Corruption and mismanagement of the economy dominanted by the Sino-
Khmer urban popuatoon By he end of his rule long-standing econmic
ineualitlies had been reinformeced and the state had been wekened
(10).
throughout the pre-war (1970) preiod he great bulk of the
rural popoulaiton were small rice producers (10) Though output rose
tehier stadnard of living did not. Land was disributed relatively
equlaiyy with 84% owning their own land as of the 1962 cnesus,
lanlodrism was on the increase by the alte 1960s in a few
provinces. Teh OROC set up in 1956 to break the Chines traders
monopaoly on rice sales and for usuaroiuos lending evolved intoa
rurla segemtnof the civil servcie benefitting currupteed officiials
and teh traders. Progressivey took over rice trnading (1). this
dmpen prodcution and encouraged smauggling and aslaes to the
communists in VeietNam. Trade nationalized in 1964. Army units
palced in charge of gathering the rice suplsu, leading to armed
unrrest, with tens of thoudansds of farmers fleeing and perhaps
thousands killed (Chandler, 1996, cited, 12). Teh tehn-weak CPK
used this dissatisfaction to attract supporters. Teh governmetn
hasd ensured long term eocomic delcine. High income inequality
(data). Though edcuation ws still lwo there were not enough places
in gov't for  the graduation Khmers byt he alte 1960s, since they
had no repsect for business jobs (17). Teh Chinese and Sino-Khmenr
headl a dnear monopoly on commerce and trade as well as high-rnakig
gov't positions (17), and were moslty city-dwellers except for  the
network of rural traders. ....."Impoversidhe rrual socieity
disdained by a frustrated urban and edcuated eltie, itself
dominated by a circle of cronies, empowered by Sihanouk's approval
and a corrupt state apparatus."
REmoved by a coup in 1970. Teh new Khmer Republic heavily spported
byt eh USA attempted to suppress an interanl Communist led
revolution. Lon Nol begins by brutal suppresion of stduents and
peasnat movements suuporting the former king.  A vietnamese46
progrom. Teh CPK, assisted by North vietnam and led bo Pol POot
with sihanouk as titualr ehad gained ground. amercia carpeot bomong
of allegedly CPK contorleed areas hruts civilian poplaut
 allegedly CPK contorleed areas hruts civilian poplautoion (3) By
end of wat in 1975, 300-700 m Cambodians ahd died (4) and 2.5M been
displaced. Under teh KR 350 thousand die in first five months,
mainoy excutions of governemt peope and the edcuated. TEh KR
project then fails aas agricultural produciton collapses and
widepsread famiena nd epidenics uensue. (5). IN 1979 the
Viet.offensive topples the gov't (6).
IN a tremendous historic irony, teh Khmer Rouge believed in
radical egalitarian collectivism (25) and that only compete
revolution could redress injustice and reomoce teh casues of
oppresision (24). Hyptohesese re sorues of heir brutal behaviour.
Abolished provate property and the other sumptioms of capitalism.
Main economic goal was to triple rice prodcution, but their
simplistic irrigation plasn were disastrously misguided, ignoring
basic hydoroloigcla and tehcnicla guidlines. Want ed to annihialite
whole cateoires--mercahtns, administrators, ecuaitoned and
technically skilled of any kind. Teh mimmense destruciton due to
the war drove teh emergency of the early KR period (26). since they
did not keep the support of the peasants they were always dealing
with disseidents so always needign to rub out someine. (26).
A deliberate process of vulnerabilitization of the vast
majorotyu of the popoaution, with massive dipslacement of the
poplautloion to break all tradiaitonal likas of solidarity within
families, communties and class gorups."(27).
In the Sudan a preiviously symbiotic relationship between
pastorlaists and farmers broke down around the ealry 198s (Klein,
n.d., 5) Teh nomasds organied adn "aran congregation" in 1987 and
turned agsint the farmers rather than the gov't. This was tolerated
and at times supported by teh gov't. But where the farmers could
genreate mor prodict, the gov't leaned the other way. Sometimes the
state is the source of the ocnflict,a s with teh Mechanised Farming
Project of 1968; this pushed cultivatros offf the alnd and drove
out pastoral nomads. IN many cases these two groups turned agaisnt
each other rather than agasint the ste (6). In the lower Jubaa
valey of Somalia local farmers were forced off the land first to
make way for mecahnsized state farms and then , followin the reform
of land registiration legislation i 1975, by uran elites. All thes
projects were funded fboy foreign donors (6). No productivity gaisn
resulted but the political elites did gain (7). Teh elite than
diverted and looted aid relief while forcing he dsiplaced farmers
to work on private famrs (Menkhaus and Craven, cited, 7).
Previous occupants of land near the outh of the Sengal river
were reclassified as snegalese and expelled from Mauritaini when a
bbarrage was contrsuted nearly creating a possiblitiy for cash
cropping. This act hgiehgthened racial tensionss betwenn the two47
gorups i both countries, but ethnicity was the vehicle whereby
tnesions about the use of land was chanelled (7).
Export agriculture's ointroduction can lead to massive
redsitribuion of wealth and resources within African coutnreis (7).
Levin and Weiner (1996) note tht
 "Colonial land dispossesion and pateitheid forced reomovals lie at
the ehart of the reporressive regime which the naitonal liberation
movemetn sought to overthorw. A decisive transforamtion of land and
agrarina rlations is thus intimatley bound up witht he
contrstruciton of a new democratic order in south Africa" (93).
Expectatsion in rural areas run hight. discuss the narrow limits to
land reform if the transiton insouth Afric is carreid out via an
elite pacted demoncrcy (96).
Founding of the ANC was influendced substantatilly by the
proposed land bills which culminated in the 1913 Land Acts. Land
and rural struggle sin the 1940s and 1950s were important in
transofring the ANC into a braod-based antional movement. (97). But
the mass mobilization of the 1980s and finally the settlement which
brought deomcoracy in 1994 was inpsired more by the urban mass
struggls and the political unionism of the ANC led Congress
alliance than by rural interests. Teh leadrship cadre and guiding
ideology were drawn mainly fro the urban petty-bourgoeisie and
proletariat (98). Teh movemetns failed to eaither lead or follow
the peasants (98).
(Discussion of the evidence linking agrarian structure to violence
of the various types noted above).
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